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A cyber-attack can become costly if small businesses are not prepared to protect their 
information systems or lack the ability to recover from a cybersecurity incident. Small 
businesses that are not ready to deal with cyber threats are risking significant disruption 
and loss. In many cases the small business decision makers, owners or managers, do not 
have a strategy to improve their cybersecurity posture despite the known risk to their 
business. This research study focused on the relationship between two constructs that are 
associated with readiness and resilience of small businesses based on their cybersecurity 
planning, implementation, as well as response and recovery activities. An empirical 
assessment was conducted on small businesses’ level of cybersecurity preparedness 
relative to their decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack (perceived likelihood x 
perceived impact).  
Subject matter experts (SMEs) were used to validate a set of cybersecurity preparedness 
activities for the construct of cybersecurity preparedness. The SMEs approved 70 
cybersecurity preparedness activities among the five functions of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework to assess the level of 
cybersecurity preparedness of small businesses. The SMEs then assigned weights to the 
validated preparedness activities to enable an aggregated benchmark cybersecurity 
preparedness score (CPS). The construct of the decision maker’s perceived risk of cyber-
attack (DMPRCA) was updated with a set of common cyber threat vectors and using 
simple definitions from the SMEs. 
A Cybersecurity Preparedness-Risk Taxonomy (CyPRisT) was then developed using the 
theoretical foundation of prospect theory and status quo bias. The four quadrants of 
cybersecurity risk postures were defined as indifference, susceptible, aversive, 
and strategic. The aggregated scores of CPSs and DMPRCA were positioned on the 
CyPRisT for each of the 216 small businesses who participated in this study. Statistical 
differences were found in the CPSs and DMPRCA by demographics industry, size 
(number of employees), and Information Technology (IT) budget (%). The findings of 
the quantitative analysis are presented along with the position on the CyPRisT for each 
demographic indicator of the businesses. 
The Cybersecurity Assessment of Risk Management to optimize Readiness and 
Resilience (cyberARMoRR) program for small businesses was developed as a 
cybersecurity strategy planning guide and collection of resources. The cyberARMoRR 
program was administered to 50 small business decision makers. The CPSs and 
DMPRCA were evaluated before and after participation in cyberARMoRR program and 
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positioned on the CyPRisT to assess differences in the small businesses’ cybersecurity 
posture. The results of the paired sample t-test showed no significant differences between 
the pretest and posttest groups. However, there was an observed increase in both the 
CPSs and DMPRCA that moved the position toward the risk-aversive quadrant of the 
CyPRisT.  
An analysis of the empirical data was conducted on the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities that participants identified as most challenging to implement and their 
explanations of why. Data were collected from 15 semi-structured interviews and 50 
surveys with five open-ended questions, one per each function of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework. A two-cycle thematic analysis was performed using the responses that 
described the challenges of cybersecurity preparedness activities. The results of the 
qualitative analysis suggest that small business decision makers are more likely to 
improve their ability to mitigate cyber threats when the applicable technologies are 
uncomplicated, technical expertise is accessible, and cybersecurity educational material is 
easy to understand. The small business owners and managers also indicated that the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities are more attainable when the demand of their time 
did not change their focus away from business operations. Conversely, the small 
businesses that were able to improve their cybersecurity posture had committed to 
incorporating many of the cybersecurity preparedness activities into their routine business 
processes, such as allocating a budget for cybersecurity and performing vulnerability 
assessments. The effects of prospect theory and status quo bias are discussed in the 
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Cybercriminals are targeting small businesses with weak cybersecurity postures 
because it is easy to exploit the businesses’ vulnerabilities (Symantec Corporation, 2016). 
Data from the Ponemon Institute (2016, 2017, 2018) showed an alarming trend in the 
significant rise of small businesses experiencing cyber-attacks over a period of 3 years. In 
a report from Verizon Enterprise (2018), the majority of victims were small businesses 
involving data breaches with confirmed disclosure to an unauthorized party. Yet, 
according to the Better Business Bureau (BBB) (2017), most small businesses are less 
likely to take comprehensive measures to improve their cybersecurity postures, 
identifying barriers of resources, time, and knowledge. If small businesses are not 
adequately prepared, they risk substantial losses caused by the inevitable cyber-attack 
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016). A single cybersecurity incident can result in financial loss, 
damage to credibility, legal recourse, and disruption of business (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010; Chittister & Haimes, 2011; Hovav & Gray, 2014). Consequently, the 
impact of a cyber-incident is disproportionately high for the smallest companies because 
they typically have fewer resources to prepare and deal with cyber-attacks (Hiscox, 
2017). Even when cyber threats are imminent, most small businesses are underprepared 
to deal with the risk (Hiscox, 2017; Rohn, Sabari, & Leshem, 2016). The ability of the 
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small business to achieve an appropriate cyber posture has been associated with the 
disposition of the decision makers’ (i.e., owners or managers) cyber threat concerns and 
risk perception (Bhattacharya, 2011; Rohn et al., 2016). This research study addressed the 
limited ability of small businesses to mitigate cyber threats, which leads businesses to 
significant losses from cyber-attacks or data breaches (Berry & Berry, 2018; Paulsen, 
2016; Rohn et al., 2016). 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 includes a 
statement of the specific research problem and the main dissertation goal, followed by 
research questions, as well as the relevance and significance of this research. Next, 
specific barriers and issues were identified as well as assumptions, limitations, and 
delimitations for conducting this research study. Finally, definitions are provided to help 
the reader remove ambiguities that may exist with key terms that were used in this 
research study. Chapter 2 comprises a literature review of related research on each of the 
relevant topic areas: cybersecurity risk management, common cyber threats to small 
businesses, cybersecurity readiness, cybersecurity resilience, cybersecurity preparedness, 
decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack, as well as prospect theory and status quo 
bias. Chapter 3 presents methodology for this research study with the specific data 
collection and analysis techniques that were used to assess the taxonomy of cybersecurity 
preparedness and decision makers’ perceived risk. Furthermore, Chapter 3 outlines the 
developmental research methods, including sequential exploratory design and quasi-






The research problem which this study addressed was the limited ability of small 
businesses to mitigate cyber threats, which leads to significant losses from cyber-attacks 
or data breaches (Berry & Berry, 2018; Paulsen, 2016; Rohn et al., 2016). Information 
security standards as well as cybersecurity frameworks provide guidelines of activities, 
with processes and procedures for organizations to follow when establishing a 
cybersecurity program (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2014, 
2018; Paulsen & Toth, 2016). The key components of a successful program consist of 
preparedness activities to manage cyber risk and activities to ensure business continuity 
when an event occurs (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004; Fisher, Norman, & Klett, 2017). A 
cyber-attack or data breach becomes a cybersecurity incident if the event “has been 
determined to have an impact on the organization prompting the need for response and 
recovery” (NIST, 2018, p. 45). 
Information systems (IS) researchers have recommended strategies that take into 
consideration a balanced approach of two cybersecurity paradigms: prevention and 
response (Baskerville, Spagnoletti, & Kim, 2014). A business’s level of readiness is an 
evaluation of how ‘well-prepared’ it is to prevent and protect from cyber threats (Hiscox, 
2017; Peiro, Cook, & Beydoun, 2005; Sumner, 2009). Resilience is having the ability to 
respond properly by adapting to changing conditions, to recover from a cybersecurity 
incident, and then to assume close-to-normal operations within an acceptable time and 
total cost (Chittister & Haimes, 2011; Department of Homeland Security, 2017). 
Therefore, a strategically balanced cybersecurity posture considers both readiness and 
resilience. Cybersecurity readiness is being prepared to minimize and manage risk 
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(Hurley, McGibbon, & Everetts, 2014), while cybersecurity resilience is the ability to 
maintain business continuity during as well as after a cybersecurity incident (Bodeau & 
Graubart, 2017).  
The smallest companies, such as those without dedicated IT support, are among 
the most vulnerable because they are less likely to have a well-established cybersecurity 
preparedness strategy (Hiscox, 2017; Sumner, 2009). Cyber-attacks against small 
businesses have recently become more targeted with a higher level of sophistication, 
resulting in severe consequences and negative financial impacts (Ponemon Institute, 
2017). According to Verizon Enterprise (2018), 58% of data breach victims are small 
businesses likely due to their lack of cybersecurity controls or risk mitigation processes. 
Cyber threats to IS and data come from an assortment of common attack vectors, 
including deliberate threats (e.g., ransomware attacks) as well as accidental acts (e.g., 
unintentional disclosure by an employee). Over the 5-year period from 2014 to 2018, the 
top patterns of cyber incidents have involved some form of hacking, malware, social 
engineering, physical loss, misuse, or error (Verizon Enterprise, 2018). 
The BBB (2017) emphasized small businesses are an essential part of the 
cybersecurity economic ecosystem since they can be exploited by cybercriminals seeking 
a gateway into partnering larger organizations when part of their supply chain. For 
example, one of the largest consumer data breaches occurred in late 2013 after hackers 
exploited the network access of a small heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning 
(HVAC) system supplier (Symantec Corporation, 2017). Stakes can also be high for 
small businesses, potentially affecting their livelihoods if decisions toward security 
countermeasures result in loss (Kumar, Park, & Subramaniam, 2017). The smallest 
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businesses suffer a disproportionately higher financial impact from a cyber-attack when 
their losses are adjusted to organizational size and revenue (Hiscox, 2017; Itai & 
Onwubiko, 2018). More than 99% of all businesses registered in the United States (U.S.) 
have fewer than 100 employees, and 97% fewer than 20 employees (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2015; U.S. Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, n.d.). These small businesses 
face unique challenges when managing cybersecurity risk due to constraints such as 
financial resources and technical expertise (Hess & Cottrell, 2015). Small businesses with 
fewer employees have been found to be more exposed to cyber-attacks but less likely to 
take comprehensive measures toward improving their cybersecurity postures (BBB, 
2017). A medium or large company may have sustainable resources for dealing with 
cyber-attacks, whereas the relatively low net income of a small business generally 
equates to fewer resources allocated toward cyber defense strategies (Hovav & Gray, 
2014; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). 
The three main challenges faced by small businesses are not having the in-house 
expertise to mitigate cyber risk, IT budget constraints, and a general lack of 
understanding of how to protect against cyber-attacks (Ponemon Institute, 2018). In 
response to the growing number of cybersecurity challenges in the small business 
community, government agencies have published guidance based on standards and best 
practices for mitigating risk that have been used in larger businesses as well as federal 
agencies. Examples include the U.S. Computing Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) Resources for Small and Medium Businesses, the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) Small Biz Cyber Planner, and the NIST Interagency Report 7621 
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016). A limited number of researchers have examined guidance for 
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cybersecurity preparedness as well as the relation between cyber threat concerns, risk 
management, and the cybersecurity postures of small businesses. Select examples include 
Rohn et al.’s (2016) study of small business security posture as well as Berry and Berry’s 
(2018) assessment of small business risk management approaches to cybersecurity risk.  
Many small businesses lack cybersecurity incident prevention and response plans 
because their decision makers (i.e., owners or managers) either do not believe they are at 
risk or do not consider cybersecurity among their top concerns for the business 
(Experian-CSID, 2016). Alternatively, the BBB (2017) found most small businesses are 
very concerned about cybersecurity but are still less likely to have a plan in place to 
mitigate risk and respond to cyber threats. Rohn et al. (2016) found small business 
owners often have the tendency to underestimate cybersecurity risk, suggesting social 
theories may help to explain business owners’ inaccurate perception of risk as well as the 
“lack of commensurate action” (p. 549). Berry and Berry (2018) found small business 
owners struggle with risk management approaches for mitigating cyber threats due to the 
rapid pace of advancement in technologies. This evidence is supported by other research 
illustrating the ability of small businesses to mitigate cyber threats is limited by the 
resources needed to update technologies or expertise continuously to develop a 
preparedness strategy (Cragg, Caldeira, & Ward, 2011; Sumner, 2009).  
Cybersecurity practitioners and IS scholars have suggested small businesses are at 
high risk for systems compromise because they do not know what to protect (Osborn and 
Simpson, 2018; Paulsen, 2016). For example, Osborn and Simpson (2017) argued small 
businesses are struggling with the complex demands of risk assessment practices and how 
to assimilate cybersecurity advice into their organizations. Renaud (2016) found small 
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businesses are inconsistent in their implementation of security measures based on their 
appraisal of threat and ability to implement risk controls. Key findings from recent 
cybersecurity benchmark reports also showed small businesses are challenged with 
cybersecurity initiatives to ensure a quick response to emerging cyber threats (Hiscox, 
2017). Therefore, additional research is required to examine empirically small business 
cybersecurity activities for preparedness, decision makers’ perceptions of risk, and 
approaches to improve small businesses’ cybersecurity postures (Berry & Berry, 2018; 
Rohn et al., 2016). 
 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this research study was to develop and validate a small business 
Cybersecurity Preparedness-Risk Taxonomy (CyPRisT) to assess empirically small 
businesses’ cybersecurity postures (readiness & and resilience), and then to develop a 
strategy program for small businesses to improve their cybersecurity risk management. 
The Cybersecurity Assessment of Risk Management to optimize Readiness and 
Resilience (cyberARMoRR) for small businesses is a strategy planning program that was 
developed consisting of cybersecurity preparedness activities, outcomes, resources, and 
references following a recommended implementation schedule (e.g., week, month, 
quarter, year). The need for this work has been demonstrated in the work of Sumner 
(2009), Chittister and Haimes (2011), as well as Baskerville et al. (2014). Sumner (2009) 
examined risk in both small and mid-sized businesses based upon the perceived impact as 
well as perceived probability of various threat vectors, finding high levels of 
preparedness were not always aligned with high levels of risk. Chittister and Haimes 
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(2011) studied critical factors in cybersecurity preparedness and resilience, including the 
tradeoffs organizations make in their quest to mitigate threats (i.e., associated costs, 
benefits, and risk). Baskerville et al. (2014) evaluated security frameworks and the 
dynamic nature of threats to business IS, finding a balance of prevention and response 
strategies is critical in implementing an effective information security program. 
This work builds on the prior research by proposing a taxonomy to assist small 
businesses to evaluate their cybersecurity postures through an assessment of their 
readiness and resilience against cyber-attacks. The CyPRisT, applied to the context of 
small business cybersecurity, was similar to the development of the mobile 
cyberslacking-commitment taxonomy (MCCT) by Alharthi, Levy, Wang, and Hur 
(2019). Nussbaum and Lewis (2017) differentiated the cybersecurity challenges based on 
an organization’s size. 
There is clearly a wide array of small business definitions applied in business and 
IS literature as well as the cybersecurity benchmark reports. For example, per 
government tax laws, small businesses vary by classification of industry, annual revenue, 
fixed assets, or employee count (Dilger, 2019). Because there is no generally accepted 
definition of small businesses, this research study focused on the most vulnerable small 
business enterprises, those with 10–50 employees (Rohn et al., 2016). Berry and Berry 
(2018) suggested more research is needed to understand small businesses’ approaches to 
risk management and their responses to cybersecurity threats. Similarly, the industry 
focus of small business varies greatly. This industry categories for this research study was 
based on the North American Industry Classification Codes System (BBB, 2017, 
Romanosky, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). 
9 
 
The approach for this research follows Carlton and Levy (2017), who leveraged 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework as the basis for developing a cybersecurity risk and 
mitigation tool, including a cybersecurity skills index. The NIST Interagency Report 
7621 Revision 1 is the small business fundamentals guideline for organizing 
cybersecurity risk management process and procedure (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). To 
evaluate the level of preparedness for a small business, the measures of cybersecurity 
preparedness activities were identified and validated using a panel of cybersecurity 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), that were derived from the recommended cybersecurity 
activities in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2018; Paulsen & Toth, 2016). 
Perceived cybersecurity risk is based on the impact and probability (likelihood) of 
common cyber-attack vectors identified in cybersecurity benchmark reports, such as the 
Ponemon Institute (2016, 2017, 2018), Symantec Corporation (2016, 2017, 2018), and 
Verizon Enterprise (2016, 2017, 2018). When considering risk perceptions, Boss (2007) 
stated the “probability assessment at the individual level is composed of individual 
appraisal regarding the likelihood that the unfavorable experience will happen, and the 
impact of that experience were it to happen” (p. 27). In this context, small business 
owners must often make cybersecurity risk decisions with uncertainty of threats and 
likelihood of attacks as well as the impacts to their business (Hayes, Tanner, & Schmidt, 
2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rees, Deane, Rakes, & Baker, 2011). For example, 
Rohn et al. (2016) suggested small business decision makers are bias in their risk 
perception based on a lack of experience in cybersecurity risk management, leading them 
to underestimate the probability of cyber-attacks. Thus, decision makers of a small 
business may be susceptible to common cyber-attacks, risk averse, or risk neutral based 
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on their concern for minimizing downtime and expected losses (Chen, Kataria, & 
Krishnan, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This assessment of cybersecurity 
preparedness activities in relation to the decision maker’s perceived risk of cyber-attacks 
provides insight into the status of small business cybersecurity posture (Lee & Joshi, 
2016; Osborn & Simpson, 2017). 
To achieve the main goal, this research study addressed eight specific goals. The 
first specific goal was to identify and validate by SMEs the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities from each of the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (Identify, 
Protect, Detect, Respond, & Recover) that can be used to measure the level of 
preparedness for a small business (an inventory-based measure following the 
recommendations of the five functions of NIST Cybersecurity Framework). 
Cybersecurity measures vary in complexity, expertise, and financial investment to 
minimize vulnerabilities (NIST, 2018; Osborn & Simpson, 2017). The prioritization and 
importance of cybersecurity preparedness activities were considered in the context of 
smaller businesses, such as those with less than 50 employees, because they are among 
the most vulnerable (BBB, 2017; Hiscox, 2017; Rohn et al., 2016). 
The second specific goal of this research study was to have SMEs assign weights 
to the small business cybersecurity preparedness activities in order to aggregate the 
measures so they may be used as a benchmarking tool for scoring small business 
cybersecurity preparedness. The approach of identifying mathematical weights for the 
SME-approved cybersecurity preparedness activities is useful when computing composite 
scores and establishing content validity in assessments (Bobko, Roth, & Buster, 2007). 
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The third specific goal of this research study was to identify and validate by 
SMEs the measure for small business decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber threats to 
small businesses. The cyber threat vectors were categorized by the most common cyber-
attack types small businesses experience: hacking (e.g., stolen credentials), malware (e.g., 
ransomware), social engineering (e.g., phishing), misuse (e.g., malicious insider), and 
web-based attacks (Hayes et al., 2012; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014; Ponemon Institute, 
2018; Verizon Enterprise, 2018). Risk analysis techniques typically include a 
prioritization of cybersecurity activities that rely on judgment of threats. This judgement 
of uncertainty is an assessment of threat including the potential impact it may have on the 
business and the likelihood of an attack (Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015; Paulsen & Toth, 
2016). Thus, the decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack measure included an 
assessment of potential impact and probability of occurrence for the cybersecurity threats 
to their small business (Sumner, 2009). 
The fourth specific goal of this research study was to measure cybersecurity 
preparedness as well as decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack for a sample of 
small businesses in the U.S. This research study empirically positioned the sample of 
small businesses’ cybersecurity preparedness and decision makers’ perceived risk of 
cyber-attack scores by classifying them in the CyPRisT to indicate their cybersecurity 
postures for business continuity. As shown in Figure 1, there are four dimensions for the 
CyPRisT: indifference (Q1), susceptible (Q2), aversive (Q3), and strategic (Q4) to 
represent the benchmark scores of cybersecurity preparedness and the measure of small 
business decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack. The taxonomy quadrants are 
based on the theoretical foundations of status quo bias and advances in prospect theory, 
12 
 
threat appraisal, indifference, susceptibility to losses and aversion, and strategic decision 
making as affected by risk perceptions (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Lee & 
Joshi, 2016; Liang & Xue, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
 
 
Figure 1. Cybersecurity Preparedness-Risk Taxonomy (CyPRisT). 
 
The fifth specific goal of this research study was to identify statistically 
significant differences in the cybersecurity preparedness scores and decision makers’ 
perceived risk of cyber-attack when controlled for: (a) industry, (b) number of 
employees, (c) years in operation, (d) annual revenue, and (e) IT budget. The sixth 
specific goal was to identify the differences between the levels of small business 
cybersecurity preparedness as well as the decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack 
before and after the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. Thus, for small 
businesses willing to participate in further phases of the research, the cyberARMoRR 
program was offered to help improve their risk mitigation strategy. Cybersecurity SMEs 
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validated the topics and alignment of program content to the validated measures of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities and common cyber-attack vectors to small 
businesses approved in the first and third specific goals, respectively. 
The seventh specific goal of this research study was to determine which 
cybersecurity preparedness activities were implemented by the small business after 
participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. Finally, the eighth 
specific goal of this research study was to identify which of the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities were most challenging for the small business participants to 
implement and why they decided not to mitigate certain risk. As described, the eight 
specific goals supported the main goal of this research study through a set of eight 
corresponding research questions. The following research questions thus formed the basis 
of the research and approach. 
 
Research Questions 
The main research question that this research study addressed was: what 
cybersecurity preparedness activities may be used to develop a small business 
cybersecurity preparedness-risk taxonomy (CyPRisT) to assess small businesses’ 
cybersecurity postures (readiness & resilience) empirically, then benchmark for a 
cybersecurity strategy planning program to improve risk management in small 
businesses? The eight research questions this research study addressed were: 
RQ1. What is the SME-approved set of cybersecurity preparedness activities from 
the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (Identify, Protect, 
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Detect, Respond, & Recover), which need to be measured to assess the level 
of cybersecurity preparedness for a small business? 
RQ2. What are the SME-identified weights of the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities that enable an aggregation score to benchmark the level of 
preparedness for a small business? 
RQ3. What is the SME-approved set of cyber-attack vectors, which address the 
most common cyber threats to a small business? 
RQ4. How are the sample small businesses positioned on the Cybersecurity 
Preparedness-Risk Taxonomy (CyPRisT) using the cybersecurity 
preparedness scores and the decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-
attack? 
RQ5. Do statistically significant differences exist in cybersecurity preparedness 
scores and decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack based on: (a) 
industry, (b) number of employees, (c) years in operation, (d) annual 
revenue, and (e) IT budget? 
RQ6. Do statistically significant differences exist in the cybersecurity 
preparedness scores as well as the decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-
attack before and after participation in the Cybersecurity Assessment of 
Risk Management to optimize Readiness and Resilience (cyberARMoRR) 
program for small businesses? 
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RQ7. What cybersecurity preparedness activities were implemented after 
participation in the Cybersecurity Assessment of Risk Management to 
optimize Readiness and Resilience (cyberARMoRR) program for small 
businesses? 
RQ8. What cybersecurity preparedness activities were most challenging for small 
businesses to implement and why? 
 
Relevance and Significance 
This research study was relevant because it provided insight into an area with a 
limited number of research studies empirically assessing the implementation of the 
recommended cybersecurity activities in small businesses (Gafni & Pavel, 2019). This 
research study was significant because it contributed to the knowledge base on IS risk 
management, cybersecurity posture, and business continuity for small businesses. Gupta 
and Hammond (2005) reported many small business owners are not adept at 
implementing appropriate cybersecurity measures. Recent cybersecurity surveys have 
revealed small business owners know they are at risk of cybersecurity incidents, but do 
not know what activities will protect their businesses (BBB, 2017; Paulsen, 2016). 
Recent cybersecurity benchmark reports have indicated most small business owners are 
concerned about cyber threats and the impacts of cyber-attacks, but do not believe they 
use data worth being targeted. In other words, small business owners are concerned about 
cybersecurity risk mitigation and response but are “doing little to proactively prepare for 
such attacks” (Experian-CSID, 2016, p. 6). 
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Verizon Enterprise (2018) reported small businesses accounted for 58% of the 
cybersecurity incidents where the data breach was confirmed disclosure to an unauthored 
party. Year after year, hackers breached more than half the small businesses in the U.S. 
(Ponemon Institute, 2016, 2017, 2018). Over three-quarters of the hacking victims 
involved small businesses with compromised web applications or business systems with 
malware introduced through phishing emails as part of a multifaceted attack method 
(Verizon Enterprise, 2017). Most importantly, according to the BBB (2017), more than 
half of small businesses do not survive more than 2 months after suffering a major data 
loss. Small businesses typically lack the expertise or resources to invest in cybersecurity, 
and thus need to consider an improvement to their business strategy process by 
implementing a prioritized cybersecurity program to help protect from theft, disclosure, 
and misuse (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). A voluntary framework adopted by small businesses 
will help to guide the cybersecurity strategy by aligning cybersecurity activities with 
business processes and enabling business owners to better manage their risk (NIST, 
2018). Thus, an empirical assessment of the relationship between cybersecurity 
preparedness activities and decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack may be 
beneficial in making decisions to improve the cybersecurity postures of small businesses. 
 
Relevance 
The relevance of this research study is that small businesses continue to struggle 
with cybersecurity risk management as well as the strategic balance of prevention and 
response paradigms (Baskerville et al., 2014; Hiscox, 2017). Consequently, hackers and 
cybercriminals target small businesses due their inability to implement essential 
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cybersecurity safeguards (Ponemon Institute, 2017). These inadequacies as well as the 
underprioritizing of cybersecurity preparedness in small businesses puts many of them at 
high risk of negative financial impacts and severe consequences when subjected to a 
cyber-attack (Experian-CISD, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2016, 2017, 2018). The financial 
impact of a cyber incident is disproportionately high for the smallest companies (Hiscox, 
2017). The BBB (2017) confirmed smaller businesses “are less likely to have taken 
comprehensive measures in regard to cybersecurity, businesses with fewer employees are 
more exposed to potential breaches and, thereby, the financial losses that can accompany 
such an attack” (p. 15).  
Some IS researchers addressing this problem have reported incomplete or 
contradictory findings because attention has been focused on a few specific cybersecurity 
procedures, practices, and policies (Berry & Berry, 2018). Thus, a more comprehensive 
measure for assessing cybersecurity preparedness must consider an inventory of the 
cybersecurity activities from all five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST, 2018). Small business owners’ perception of risk is an important component to 
the small business cybersecurity posture (Rohn et al., 2016). Previous research (e.g., 
Sumner, 2009) has taken into consideration the perceived risk as it relates to impact and 
probability of threats. When small business decision makers lack concern toward 
cybersecurity problems, they are more likely to be ill-prepared to deal with cybersecurity 
threats (Bhattacharya, 2011). As such, if small business decision makers are aware of the 
common cyber threats and perform strategic planning of cybersecurity preparedness 
activities, their risk perception may become better aligned with their cybersecurity 
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This study advanced current research in the areas of cybersecurity and business 
continuity. As a result, the findings and artifacts contributed to the body of knowledge in 
the fields of cybersecurity, risk management, and small business management. The 
business continuity of a small business in event of a cyber-attack or data breach is 
dependent on its ability to achieve an adequate posture of cybersecurity readiness and 
resilience. Although considerable risk management literature has been published focusing 
on improvements in cybersecurity for small and medium businesses, a gap exists with 
respect to the instruments needed to assess cybersecurity preparedness and perceived risk 
of cyber-attack with a focus on small businesses (Renaud, 2016; Rohn et al., 2016). Prior 
research has not accurately or consistently assessed the cybersecurity postures of small 
businesses in relation to cybersecurity preparedness activities and decision makers’ risk 
perceptions (Berry & Berry, 2018). Thus, this research study provided a benchmarking 
tool and taxonomy enabling small business decision makers to assess their current 
cybersecurity postures. Additionally, this research study offered a cybersecurity planning 
program that may be used as a strategic guide for small businesses to manage their risk 
through prioritized cybersecurity preparedness activities to mitigate cyber-attacks and 




Barriers and Issues 
This research study had several potential barriers and issues that were addressed. 
The first challenge was developing a valid survey instrument to measure cybersecurity 
preparedness activities and assign weights. Straub (1989) recommended using the Delphi 
method to evaluate the measurement instrument and improve instrument validity. 
Accordingly, during the first phase, the Delphi method was used to collect data from 
SMEs to validate measures for the survey instrument (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The 
same SMEs also approved a set of cyber-attack vectors representing the common cyber 
threats to small businesses in order to measure decision makers’ perceived risk. The SME 
consensus of approved cybersecurity preparedness activities and common cyber-attacks 
was then used to align topics of the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses.  
The second challenge was vetting the experience of SMEs. To mitigate this 
concern, the selection for the panel included only qualified cybersecurity experts with an 
appropriate level of cybersecurity experience and education as well as professional 
certification credentials. Third, there was the potential for a low response rate from the 
SMEs, especially considering the multiple rounds required during the first phase. 
According to Skinner, Nelson, Chin, and Land (2015), an expert panel size ranges from 
10–30 SMEs. To control the possibility of a low response rate as well as nonresponses, 
35 SMEs were contacted for participation. This research study received feedback from 22 
SMEs using the Delphi method. Finally, permission from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) is needed to conduct a study when human subjects are involved. Therefore, IRB 
approval was obtained prior to conducting this study. 
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Another potential challenge for this research study was the communication of the 
survey instrument and solicitation to attain the target sample of small business decision 
makers. Kotulic and Clark (2004) observed a lack of empirical research within the 
discipline of information security risk management and concluded that businesses were 
reluctant to participate in research due to a general mistrust in disclosing their IS 
vulnerabilities to an “outsider” without prior support from executive management. To 
address this issue, data were collected from individual decision makers. The small 
business decision maker is either an owner or manager responsible for the risk and 
rewards of his or her business decisions. The survey instrument was kept concise, 
minimizing wording in questions that may prompt adverse reaction, in order to encourage 
further participation in the next phase of this research study. The survey instrument was 
structured in a manner that was easy for participants to submit responses (i.e., Yes or No 
for each of the cybersecurity preparedness activities) and avoided collecting confidential 
details about their business environment. However, soliciting participants was still a 
challenge due to the length of the survey. To encourage participation further, the 
researcher provided participants access to a voluntary, no-commitment, and no-cost 
cyberARMoRR program with resources and references to improve their cybersecurity 
postures. Thus, the appeal for participation stemmed from a focus on improving their 
cybersecurity postures through an assessment of cybersecurity preparedness activities and 




Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
The purpose of assumptions, limitations, and delimitations are to determine the 
scope while considering potential difficulties and controls for making this research study 
relevant (Simon, 2011). Assumptions are plausible beliefs that are accepted without proof 
and assumed to be true within the context of a research study (Simon & Goes, 2013). 
Limitations are weaknesses beyond the control of the researcher that may potentially 
impact the generalizability, reliability, or validity of a research study (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2016). Delimitations are intentional boundaries imposed by the researcher to manage the 
scope of a research study (Simon, 2011). The following assumptions, limitations, and 
delimitations were identified. 
Assumptions 
1. The SMEs were ethical and honest in their responses. 
2. The same SMEs participated in multiple Delphi rounds of data collection for 
instrument development, instrument revisions, and CyberARMoRR program 
content alignment. 
3. The small business decision makers who participated in this research study 
wanted to improve the cybersecurity postures of their businesses. 
4. The participants were honest in their responses. 
5. The participants had the authority to make decisions for their small businesses 
(i.e., owner or manager). 
6. Participants were willing to provide responses about their cybersecurity 
preparedness activities with reasonable assurance of anonymity and privacy; 




Regardless of the type of study, there are factors associated with the methods 
employed that may limit a research study (Ellis & Levy, 2010). For example, a weakness 
of a quantitative approach may be the lack of contextual meaning, while a weakness of a 
qualitative approach is sometimes generalizability of the findings (Creswell & Clark, 
2017). This research study offset methodological weaknesses by drawing on the strengths 
of mixing both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods in the research 
design.  
A known limitation of this research study was associated with expert opinions of 
the participating SMEs. This research study necessitated a commitment from the SMEs to 
provide informed judgment using the Delphi method for the development of the survey 
instrument and program topics (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). According to Ellis and Levy 
(2010), SME opinions are limited by those participating and may not represent the only 
set of requirements during the developmental research process. Voluntary experts may 
withdraw from participation in a study at any time (Ellis & Levy, 2010). To mitigate 
these limitations and preserve validity, this research study combined the Delphi method 
with review of literature and cybersecurity benchmark reports. The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (NIST, 2018) was used as a reference to identify a preliminary set of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities for the SMEs to prioritize and approve. This 
research study utilized SMEs on a voluntary basis. SMEs with requisite qualifications 
were recruited to obtain consensus for the constructs, instrument, and program topics 
(Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Skinner et al., 2015). Consensus and approval were calculated 
through average scoring of the SME responses. The SMEs were sourced through a 
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network of information security and cybersecurity professionals; the majority had an 
affiliation with higher education and interests in cybersecurity for small businesses. The 
researcher made reasonable attempts to solicit SMEs with diverse small business 
experience along with cybersecurity qualifications. The researcher and SMEs did not 
provide consulting services to the SMEs or participants if they decided to implement or 
improve any cybersecurity activities during this research study. 
Another limitation was that the respondent population of small business decision 
makers may not be evenly distributed to represent the complete range of business 
demographics (e.g., industry, number of employees, years in operation, annual revenue, 
IT budget). As with many small business studies, a limited sample size may decrease the 
generalizability of the findings. To mitigate this limitation, the sample population 
targeted a diverse range of small business owners and managers for each of the 
demographic indicators. Any outliers, or participants responding for businesses not 
meeting the small business criteria of less than 10–50 employees, were filtered through 
pre-screening data analysis. Nevertheless, reasonable efforts were made to reach a wide 
array of small business demographics through the communication and solicitation of 
participation to ensure that each small business demographic is appropriately represented. 
The participants were solicited through various professional business network 
associations and social media channels. Lastly, self-reported data from the participants 
were limited by the fact that they rarely can be independently verified and may have 
contained bias (Chan, 2009). To address the validity limitations, the survey instrument 
consisted of short and clearly written questions and was validated by the SMEs to 




A delimitation is that the scope only consisted of the two constructs: cybersecurity 
preparedness and small businesses decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack. As 
with any complex problem domain, it is likely additional factors affect a small business 
decision maker’s ability to mitigate cyber threats. For example, cost of security 
technologies and levels of proficiency will vary greatly (Romanosky, 2016). Small 
business decision makers may be constrained by resource cost factors in their ability to 
implement cybersecurity controls. Although an economic-based theoretical lens was 
adopted as the foundation for this research study, actual cost considerations of specific 
activities were intentionally excluded from scope due to the wide variety of technology 
options and skilled labor compensation. The cybersecurity preparedness activities were 
derived from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework because of its comparatively higher 
adoption rate among small businesses and the cost-neutral perspective for mitigating 
cybersecurity risk (BBB, 2017; NIST, 2018). The series of open-ended interview 
questions was focused purposefully on the SME-approved cybersecurity preparedness 
activities. Although some open questions may have solicited feedback on the 
cyberARMoRR program for future enhancements, the intent of the questions was to 
collect information about the challenges of cybersecurity preparedness activities. 
 
Definition of Terms 
The following represents the definitions of key terms used in this research study. 
Cyber-attack. “An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of 
cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling 
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a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing 
controlled information.” (NIST, 2011, p. B-3). 
Cybersecurity. “Computing-based discipline involving technology, people, 
information, and processes to enable assured operations. It involves the creation, 
operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems. It is an interdisciplinary 
course of study, including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, and risk 
management in the context of adversaries” (Association for Computer Machinery [ACM] 
Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity Education, 2017, p. 16). 
Cybersecurity event. “A cybersecurity change that may have an impact on 
organizational operations (including mission, capabilities, or reputation)” (NIST, 2018, p. 
45). 
Cybersecurity incident. “An occurrence that actually or potentially results in 
adverse consequences to (adverse effects on) (poses a threat to) an information system or 
the information that the system processes, stores, or transmits and that may require a 
response action to mitigate the consequences” (National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Careers and Studies [NICCS], 2017, n.p.). 
Cybersecurity preparedness. “The activities to build, sustain, and improve 
readiness capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from natural or 
manmade incidents” (NICCS, 2017, n.p.). 
Cybersecurity preparedness activities. A prioritized set of actions, goals, 
objectives, and outcomes, as well as informative references for managing cybersecurity 
risk that are aligned to the high-level functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework: 
Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover (NIST, 2018; Sumner, 2009). 
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Cybersecurity posture. The overall strength of an organization’s cybersecurity 
controls and how effectively it can mitigate risk as a function of cybersecurity readiness 
and resilience (Bodeau & Graubart, 2017; Hurley et al., 2014; Rohn et al., 2016). 
Cybersecurity readiness. Having situational awareness and being sufficiently 
prepared to deal with potential cyber threats to business operations, priorities, as well as 
mission by detecting and protecting against any cyber-attacks or data breach (Hurley et 
al., 2014). 
Cybersecurity resilience. “The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and 
adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on cyber resources” 
(Bodeau & Graubart, 2017, p. 1). 
Cybersecurity strategy (planning). The direction, activities, and actions needed to 
enable or improve cybersecurity in an organization (ACM Joint Task Force on 
Cybersecurity Education, 2017). 
Delphi method. “An iterative process to collect and distill the anonymous 
judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis techniques interspersed 
with feedback” (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007, p. 1). 
Data breach. “The unauthorized movement or disclosure of sensitive information 
to a party, usually outside the organization, that is not authorized to have or see the 
information” (NICCS, 2017, n.p.). 
Information system. A “work system whose processes and activities are devoted 
to processing information, that is, capturing, transmitting, storing, retrieving, 
manipulating, and displaying information” (Alter, 2008, p. 453). 
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Malware. “Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process 
that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a 
host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of malicious code” 
(Committee on National Security Systems [CNSS], 2015, p. 79). 
Perceived risk. At the individual level, the probability assessment “composed of 
individual judgments regarding the likelihood that the unfavorable experience will 
happen, and the impact of that experience were it to happen” (Boss, 2007, p. 27).  
Program. A plan or system under which action may be taken toward a goal; a set 
of related measures or activities with a particular long-term aim (Merriam-Webster, n.d.; 
Oxford Dictionary, n.d.).  
Readiness. A degree of preparedness in the ability to assess cybersecurity posture 
proactively, gauge threats, and secure IS through a program or framework for managing 
risk (Peiro et al., 2005; Sumner, 2009; Sun, Ahluwalia, & Koong, 2011). 
Resilience. “The ability of an information system to: (1) continue to operate under 
adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, while maintaining 
essential operational capabilities; and (2) recover effectively in a timely manner” 
(NICCS, 2017, n.p.). 
Risk. “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise 




Risk management. “The process of identifying, analyzing, assessing, and 
communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or controlling it to an 
acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any actions taken” (NICCS, 
2017, n.p.). 
Risk mitigation. “Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk- 
reducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process” 
(CNSS, 2015, p. 105). 
Small business. A privately owned and operated business enterprise. Small 
businesses typically have a small number of employees (e.g., less than 50) (Rohn et al., 
2016). 
Small business decision maker. An owner or manager of a small business who is 
responsible for all the risks and rewards of his or her business decisions (Gupta & 
Hammond, 2005; Hayes et al., 2012). 
Threat. “Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service” (CNSS, 2015, p. 122). 
 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an introduction of the research-worthy 
problem by presenting the background, goals, questions, relevance and significance, as 
well as assumptions, limitations, and delimitations for this research study. The 
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dissertation goal identified what this research study accomplished; the specific research 
questions helped shape the literature review and methods; the relevance and significance 
section supported the problem statement and goal; the barriers and issues identified how 
to overcome any known and potential problems related to the success of this study; the 
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations that were beyond the researcher’s control, as 
well as the factors for managing the scope of this research study; and the definition of 
terms removed ambiguity of key terminology used in this dissertation. 
The research problem this research study addressed was the limited ability of 
small businesses to mitigate cyber threats, which leads to significant losses after a cyber-
attack or data breach. The main dissertation goal was to develop and validate the 
CyPRisT then administer the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. The eight 
specific goals of this research study were also discussed. The dissertation work required 
multiple rounds of collaboration with SMEs to develop the construct cybersecurity 
preparedness activities and update the construct decision makers’ perceived risk. These 
constructs were used in the survey instrument, which was applied to the context of small 
businesses (i.e., those with 10–50 employees). The SME responses assisted in validating 
the survey instrument and aligning the cyberARMoRR program topics. Data were 
collected from 216 small business decision makers. The participants were invited to 
proceed in a quasi-experiment that led to an empirical assessment of cybersecurity 
readiness and resilience in small businesses. Chapter 2 comprises a comprehensive 
review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 then details the methodology and research design. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of this research study. Chapter 5 provides conclusions, 




Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
This chapter comprises a review of the relevant research studies pertaining to 
cybersecurity readiness and resilience in small businesses. The purpose of this literature 
review is to develop support for an exploratory study and quasi-experiment using the 
constructs of cybersecurity preparedness and small business decision makers’ perceived 
risk of cyber-attack. The analysis of the literature begins with broad discussion on the 
topics of cybersecurity risk management, cybersecurity frameworks used for risk 
management, and common cyber threats to small businesses. A review of cybersecurity 
posture, cybersecurity readiness, and cybersecurity resilience literature leads to the 
development of the first construct of cybersecurity preparedness. The relevant literature is 
reviewed for the second construct, small business decision makers’ perceived risk of 
cyber-attack. Next is a review of the literature for the theoretical foundation of this 
research study, prospect theory and status quo bias (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), as it 
relates to decision making under risk and uncertainty in the context of small businesses. 
This chapter concludes with a section summarizing what is known and unknown as 
presented by the review of relevant literature to distinguish the expected contributions of 
this research study. 
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Cybersecurity Risk Management 
The aim of risk management, for any size business, is to reduce risk exposure by 
minimizing the likelihood of negative outcomes through a process of risk analysis as well 
as informed decision making (Rees et al., 2011; Straub & Welke, 1998). The process of 
information security risk management typically includes the key steps of identifying risk, 
appraising assets, reducing vulnerabilities, assessing and controlling threats, as well as 
preparing responses to events and planning recovery from incidents (NIST, 2018). 
Cybersecurity risk is “the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event” based on the potential of an adverse impact and the likelihood of 
the occurrence (NIST, 2018, p. 46). As a strategy to mitigate cyber threats, the BBB 
(2017) recommended small businesses adopt a cybersecurity management approach, such 
as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, as first step toward a comprehensive 
cybersecurity solution (NIST, 2014). 
In general, cybersecurity risk management frameworks provide guidance for 
conducting a systematic and structured approach to mitigating vulnerabilities as well as 
dealing with cyber-attacks that may lead to substantial loss. Although the overall 
adoption rate is still relatively low, the BBB (2017) showed that the most popular 
framework used by small businesses is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Other 
reputable security frameworks include the International Organization for Standardizing 
International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27000 series and the Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) framework, especially for 
international (non-U.S.) organizations.  
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Many approaches to risk management have been developed and evaluated in IS 
literature. For example, a taxonomy of Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) 
provided a comparison of prevalent approaches used between 1995 and 2014 (Shameli-
Sendi, Aghababaei-Barzegar, & Cheriet, 2016). The work of Shameli-Sendi et al. (2016), 
while comprehensive and informative, also highlights the challenges organizations face 
when attempting to make proper risk management decisions. Innovative advancements as 
well as the proliferation of emerging technologies utilized by businesses (e.g., mobile 
computing, social media, and cloud computing) have further complicated the process of 
assessing cyber risk (Mejias & Balthazard, 2014). Rohn et al. (2016) evaluated the 
COBIT framework adopted by small businesses and found the tendencies of the 
organizations with weak cybersecurity postures were due to low levels of threat 
awareness and decision makers’ commitment to mitigate risk. Rohn et al. hypothesized 
that vulnerabilities were a manifestation of bias toward underestimating risk or the 
likelihood of an occurrence of an event, which then led to a “lack of urgency” for risk 
mitigating controls. This study was well founded using social theories but limited in the 
consideration of using risk perception as a measure in the decision makers’ appraisal of 
threats and commensurate activities toward mitigating risk (Rohn et al., 2016).  
In an earlier study, Gupta and Hammond (2005) found small businesses were 
challenged by cybersecurity strategies because the owners were not as adept at selecting 
appropriate security technologies. The effectiveness of their cybersecurity controls was 
affected by the small business decision makers’ beliefs that running the business was 
more important than counteracting security threats with new security technologies, as 
well as implementing policies and procedures. Bhattacharya (2011) later examined the 
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relation of small business owners’ level of concern and the leadership styles that were 
most effective in preventing cyber-attacks and data breaches. The empirical data showed 
a significant correlation between the leadership styles of small business owners taking 
proactive approaches to prepare against common cyber threats. However, further research 
was advised given the evolving nature of cybercrime and information security best 
practices as well as the ability of small businesses to mitigate risk. Berry and Berry 
(2018) recently conducted a study to assess small businesses’ cyber risk management 
tools and techniques. This assessment focused on password protection as well as the 
success of having cybersecurity policies in place. In the discussion of the problem, Berry 
and Berry acknowledged differences in perception related to common cyber threats but 
did not explore specific concerns beyond the questions of basic security activities. Table 
1 provides a summary of the pertinent research studies regarding cybersecurity risk 
management in small businesses. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of Cybersecurity Risk Management in Small Businesses. 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
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Cybersecurity Framework for Managing Risk. 
Cybersecurity risk management is the process of evaluating business operations 
and planning risk-related activities including assessing risk, responding to a risk once 
determined, and monitoring risk over time (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). The NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework provides a set of guidance to public as well as private sector 
organizations to improve their ability to identify, prevent, detect, respond, and recover 
from cyber-attacks (NIST, 2014, 2018). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was 
initiated in February 2013 by Executive Order 13636 (NIST, n.d.-a). The Executive 
Order tasked the development of a set of cybersecurity guidelines and standards for all 
sectors of critical infrastructure as a framework to reduce risk. After a series of five major 
workshops and comments from 15,000 cybersecurity experts and stakeholders, the NIST 
released the Cybersecurity Framework version 1.0 in 2014.  
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (CEA) officially formalized the role 
of the NIST to facilitate the continued development of the voluntary Cybersecurity 
Framework through public–private collaboration. Specifically, the CEA public law (P.L. 
113-274 S. 1353) set forth a national cybersecurity awareness and education program 
with widespread effort to make cybersecurity best practices usable by individuals, small 
to medium-sized businesses, as well as educational institutions. The CEA expanded the 
role of NIST’s development of the voluntary framework in order to identify “a 
prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach” to 
manage cyber threats (NIST, n.p.). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework continued to 
evolve through a series of workshops, engagement with stakeholders in government and 
academia, as well as feedback from industry.  
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The NIST released the Cybersecurity Framework version 1.1 in 2018, which was 
more adaptable to small businesses as well as a greater variety of industry sectors and 
nonprofit communities (NIST, n.d.-a). The new version focuses on enabling the 
framework for any organization “regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or 
cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk 
management to improving security and resilience” (NIST, 2018, p. v). According the 
NIST (n.d.-a), the new version of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed to 
be implemented by first-time users and is fully compatible with the original version if 
already in use. Organizations currently using version 1.0 may incorporate the additional 
content and functionality from version 1.1 (NIST, n.d.-a). Figure 2 shows the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework development timeline and update process from inception 
through release of versions 1.0 and 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 2. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework Update Process (NIST, n.d.-a). 
 
Recognizing the benefits of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework for small 
businesses, the U.S. Small Business Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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InfraGard partnered with the NIST in conducting research as well as development of 
outreach programs for small businesses to improve their cybersecurity postures (Paulsen 
& Toth, 2016). The NIST Interagency Report 7621 Revision 1 was recommended as a 
‘starter kit’ because it provides guidance to understand better the fundamentals of 
information security as well as the “information needed by small businesses to implement 
a program to help them understand and manage their information and cybersecurity risk” 
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016, p. 1). The ‘Framework Core’ consists of five functions to 
organizations’ risk management portfolio (NIST, 2018): Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, and Recover. As described by NIST (2018), the functions are a set of 
cybersecurity activities that “provide a high-level strategic view of the lifecycle of an 
organization’s management of cybersecurity risk” (p. 3). The functions may be 
performed concurrently or continuously as part of a cybersecurity program to establish 
and improve cybersecurity. The continuous process of five core functions are represented 
in Figure 3.  
Per the NIST (2018), the five core functions of the Cybersecurity Framework are 
defined as follows: 
1. Identify – “Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity 
risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the 
Identify Function are foundational for effective use of the Framework. 
Understanding the business context, the resources that support critical 
functions, and the related cybersecurity risks enable an organization to focus 
and prioritize its efforts, consistent with its risk management strategy and 
business needs” (NIST, 2018, p. 7). 
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2. Protect – “Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery 
of critical services. The Protect Function supports the ability to limit or 
contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event” (NIST, 2018, p. 7). 
3. Detect – “Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the 
occurrence of a cybersecurity event. The Detect Function enables timely 
discovery of cybersecurity events” (NIST, 2018, p. 7).  
4. Respond – “Develop and implement appropriate activities to take action 
regarding a detected cybersecurity incident. The Respond Function supports 
the ability to contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity incident” (NIST, 
2018, p. 8).  
5. Recover – “Develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans 
for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due 
to a cybersecurity incident. The Recover Function supports timely recovery to 
normal operations to reduce the impact from a cybersecurity incident” (NIST, 





Figure 3. The five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework version 1.1 (NIST, 
2018). 
 
Common Cyber Threats and Cyber-attacks 
A risk management approach for small businesses involves identification of the 
common cyber threats and cyber-attacks (Berry & Berry, 2018). In broad terms, a threat 
is the likelihood that a vulnerability may be exploited to cause a security breach, and an 
attack is the actual attempt of unauthorized action. There is inevitably a wide range of 
cyber threats with the potential to impact any organization negatively, regardless of 
industry or business size (Symantec Corporation, 2018). Classifications of cyber-attack 
vectors as well as the vulnerabilities exploited vary within the IS literature and 
cybersecurity benchmark reports. Cybersecurity benchmark reports provide readers 
valuable information to gauge trends of threats, cyber-attacks, and data breaches across 
various demographics. For example, Verizon Enterprise publishes an annual Data Breach 
Investigation Report (DBIR) that provides statistical summaries by incident and data 
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breach. An incident is a “security event that compromises the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of information assets,” whereas a breach “is an incident that results in the 
confirmed disclosure—not just potential exposure—of data to an unauthorized party” 
(Verizon Enterprise, 2018, p. 2). This information is then classified by threat action (i.e., 
threat actor’s tactic or mode of attack).  
A threat vector (also called an attack vector) refers to the means by which an 
attack action may occur, such as the tool, technique, or path via which an unauthorized 
actor gains access. Cyber-attacks often exploit multiple vulnerabilities or combine threat 
vectors to gain entry to a network or system, such as malware introduced through an 
email phishing attack. According to the Ponemon Institute (2017, 2018), the most 
frequent cyber-attacks causing severe financial consequences to small businesses are 
from phishing/social engineering, web-based attacks, malware, stolen devices, and denial 
of service attacks. The most frequent data breaches causing severe financial 
consequences to small businesses are from negligent employees or contractors, third-
party mistakes, errors in operating processes, and hacker attacks (Ponemon Institute, 
2017, 2018). The top claims of cybersecurity incidents reported to Hiscox (2018a) 
include ransomware, hacker attacks, and loss or misuse of data. These examples are just a 
few of many, all with varying threat vectors and vulnerabilities exploited. Nevertheless, 
the scenarios fundamentally underscore the complexity of problems that face small 
businesses as threat actors become increasingly sophisticated in their attack techniques. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the cybersecurity benchmark reports and findings relevant 
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Since 2014, Verizon Enterprise has classified the patterns of cybersecurity 
incidents and breaches into nine categories of commonality: (a) crimeware, (b) 
cyberespionage, (c) lost/stolen assets, (d) miscellaneous errors, (e) payment card 
skimmer, (f) point of sale, (g) privilege misuse, (h) web applications, and (i) everything 
else. The cyber threat actions that are leveraged to carry out an attack or data breach are 
then classified into seven categories: (a) error, (b) environmental, (c) hacking, (d) 
malware, (e) misuse, (f) physical, and (g) social (Verizon Enterprise, 2018). Similarly, 
the Symantec Corporation reports the top categories of cyber threats. Figure 4 presents a 
summary of major topics representing the shifting threat landscape between 2014 and 
2018. The topics are organized by the major categories each year. Because the reporting 
structure and cybersecurity topics vary, it is difficult to determine trends from the 
relevant facts and figures. A strong framework, using a simple and consistent 
classification of cyber-attacks, is recommended for assessing the cybersecurity posture of 
a small business in their ability to defend against common threats (Rohn et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) major topics over a 5-year period 
(Symantec Corporation, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
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Social theories may be useful for IS researchers to address the lack of sufficient 
security controls among small businesses and their limited ability to improve their 
cybersecurity postures (Rohn et al., 2016). Broadening the problem is the limited 
availability of cybersecurity product materials as well as risk management programs that 
are tailored to meet the needs of small business owners (Berry & Berry, 2018). 
Cybersecurity and IS researchers have argued there is not enough comprehensible 
information for small business owners to make informed decisions about mitigating cyber 
threats and combatting cyber-attacks (Gafni & Pavel, 2019; Osborn & Simpson, 2018). 
For example, small businesses struggle in this area due to a lack of ability to understand 
what security controls to implement and how to react when there is an incident (Osborn 
& Simpson, 2018; Ponemon Institute, 2018).  
Osborn and Simpson (2018) posited the ‘knowledge problem’ is related to the 
decision maker having a general lack of cybersecurity awareness. Similarly, Berry and 
Berry (2018) found there is a lack of ability in many small businesses to understand their 
information security needs and the use of risk management tools. For example, having 
full situation awareness of cyber threats can be an onerous process of classifying 
techniques and impacts. This process includes identifying cyber-attack methods and 
ranking dimensions based on the origin (inside/outside the company; human/nonhuman) 
and intent (deliberate/unintentional) as well as the varying degrees of consequences and 
disruptions (Jouini, Rabai, & Aissa, 2014; Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). Arguably, 
this ability is outside small business owners’ primary concern, which is naturally focused 
on “sales and revenues, in order to survive and stay in business” (Bhattacharya, 2015, p. 
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11). However, since the CEA of 2014, organizations such as the National CyberSecurity 
Alliance (NCSA) and the BBB have taken a proactive approach to offer free and easy to 
understand materials targeted for the small business community. These programs apply 
core NIST Cybersecurity Framework functions and activities to learning curricula. 
However, few empirical studies have assessed the levels of preparedness small businesses 
achieve as a result of participating in these programs or adoption of the framework. 
 
Cybersecurity Readiness 
It can be difficult for small business decision makers to assess their level of 
cybersecurity posture without first establishing a qualified reference point of 
recommended best practices and cybersecurity preparedness activities. The immersion of 
Internet-related technologies has led organizations toward evaluating the strategic 
balance of IS benefits against managing business risk based on a perspective of readiness 
(Martinsons, Davison, & Tse, 1999). The measure of this perspective is generally at the 
individual level. For example, Sun et al. (2011) measured users’ attitudes toward security 
measures by developing a model that differentiates risk propensity with IT proficiency 
and levels of data criticality. Sun et al. (2011) found a higher level of data criticality has a 
positive impact on information security readiness, but only up to the point perceived as 
important by the participants. Sun et al. suggested information security preparedness 
activities are dependent on the business decision makers’ feelings and beliefs about 
protecting data as well as their personal risk propensity. Sun et al. (2011) also suggested 
tradeoffs occur between the utility of IS and the enhancements of security 
countermeasures based on a degree of readiness. Sun et al. (2011) defined the term 
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readiness as the “degree of preparedness and inclination to use a method, rather than the 
decision whether not to use it” (p. 573). This can be interpreted as a binary decision to 
implement a control based on the decision makers’ perceptions of risk (i.e., perceived 
likelihood and perceived impact of a negative outcome). 
Researchers have also applied frameworks to organizational settings to evaluate 
levels of preparedness. For example, Susanto, Almunawar, and Tuan (2012) proposed a 
‘novelty approach’ for an integrated solution framework based on the ISO27000 series 
standards. Susanto et al. had encountered obstacles with the actual implementation of 
controls used to support the organization’s processes, particularly in cases of small 
businesses that had low adoption of ISO standards. Hurley et al. (2014) addressed some 
of the challenges of metrics and measures for the concept of cybersecurity readiness, 
suggesting a broader view that includes the key activities and milestones of a cyber 
profile. However, the perspectives of Hurley et al. (2014) predated the version 1.0 release 
of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (2014) and its adoption among small businesses. 
Although Hurley et al. (2014) examined the concept and quality of cyber-readiness 
efforts, they did not propose a measure for assessing the level of preparedness. 
 
Cybersecurity Resilience 
Cybersecurity resilience often addresses challenges for analyzing resilience at the 
national strategic level and is rooted in crisis and emergency management literature 
(Chittister & Haimes, 2011; Harrop & Matteson, 2015; Zobel & Khansa, 2012). For 
example, Kahan, Allen, and George (2009) presented a structed operational policy 
framework as building blocks for understanding the parameters of resilience. However, 
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cybersecurity resilience is also useful in the analysis of organizational IS by evaluating 
the actionable items and threats through the risk assessment process (Linkov et al., 2013). 
At the organizational level, cybersecurity resilience complements cybersecurity readiness 
in the function of establishing a strong cybersecurity posture by establishing a framework 
for business continuity and reducing impacts from major disruptions (Rohn et al., 2016). 
Cybersecurity resilience is an area of growing importance for businesses. In risk 
analysis, Haimes (2009) described the relationship between preparedness, vulnerabilities, 
and resilience as a manifestation of states in IS. In other words, resilience is a focus on 
the system’s ability to recover from an adverse event. In IS literature, resilience is often 
associated with the recovery of systems. Williams and Manheke (2010) defined 
cybersecurity resilience for small businesses as “the ability to recover and return to an 
original state, after some event has occurred to disrupt the original state” (p. 112). 
Conversely, Bodeau and Graubart (2017) considered the concept of cybersecurity 
resilience beyond the recovery paradigm to include the ability to anticipate, withstand, 
and adapt to adverse conditions as well as attacks and compromises on cyber resources. 
This can be interpreted as having the ability to call to action the level of readiness to 
ensure business continuity during and after a cybersecurity event. Accordingly, there is 
strategic significance in the ability for small businesses to achieve a resilient 
cybersecurity posture. Another perspective is that resilience consists of the cybersecurity 
principles with an objective to protect systems and ensure business continuity as an 
intended outcome of activities (Björck, Henkel, Stirna, & Zdravkovic, 2015). As such, 
many of the cybersecurity preparedness activities can be mapped to the five functions of 
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the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to provide an organization with the ability to 
withstand and recover from adverse events (NIST, 2014, 2018). 
 
The Construct of Cybersecurity Preparedness 
The concept of preparedness is a fundamental aspect of risk management that 
includes both cybersecurity readiness and resilience. Yet, it appears the conceptual 
construct of cybersecurity preparedness has not been proposed or empirically validated in 
IS research. Therefore, this research study used the aforementioned literature as the 
foundation to propose and validate empirically the construct of cybersecurity 
preparedness. To measure the level of preparedness in small businesses, the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities were based on the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, then presented, approved, and prioritized by cybersecurity SMEs, as further 
described in Chapter 3.  
 
Perceived Risk of Cyber-attack 
Perceived risk has been evaluated through various theoretical lens and contexts. 
For example, Bettman (1973), in the field of marketing, empirically examined risk 
handling and inherent risk reduction techniques in consumer decision-making processes 
using an additive model for calculating overall risk. Bettman (1973) found consumer 
decisions were influenced by perceived risk. Goodhue and Straub (1991) are among the 
seminal IS researchers who investigated the construct of perceived risk in the context of 
information security. They examined issues with IS departments and the end-users’ 
perceptions about security concerns with their systems. Protection of data as a security 
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concern is dependent on the relationship between risk perceptions and the protective 
actions to reduce risk (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). Featherman and Pavlou (2003) 
conducted a review of perceived risk in literature in order to merge the construct into a 
technology acceptance model with facets of perceived risk as a second-order variable. In 
the context of e-services adoption, this research model incorporated the likelihood of 
interacting with unknown people, products or services by measuring various dimensions 
of perceived risk. Stewart (2004) used risk compensation theory to address concept of 
perceived risk in security problems when making key business decisions suggesting 
“reaction to risk is most influenced by the severity of the possible outcome” (p. 367). 
This viewpoint is congruent with the notion that small business decision makers are 
likely to improve their security postures if there is a possibility of loss or higher 
likelihood of significant impact. 
Dinev and Hart (2006) investigated security and privacy choices through a 
theoretical calculus model that individuals use to assess risk. Dinev and Hart (2006) 
described risk beliefs as the “possibility of loss” and related perception to levels of risk 
uncertainty (p. 63). Sumner (2009) established that risk mitigation strategies, specifically 
among small and medium businesses, are often aligned with the decision makers’ 
perceived risk based on their level of preparedness to deal with common threats.  
Sun et al. (2011) proposed a psychological construct of Information Security 
Readiness (ISR) to describe attitudes toward security measures. The ISR differs from 
security awareness in that it evaluates both proficiency (knowledge and skill/expertise) 
and risk propensity. Thus, the term readiness denotes the “degree of preparedness and 
inclination to use a [cybersecurity] method, rather than the decision whether or not to use 
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it” (Sun et al., 2011, p. 573). However, the findings of Sun et al. (2011) are limited in 
generalizability because the sample population consisted of university students who were 
familiar with IT security systems rather than the business environment.  
Sangani and Vijayakumar (2012) provided an overview of cyber threats as well as 
examples of controls that small and medium sized businesses could easily implement 
with minimal costs and without disruption to service to address some of the major 
cybersecurity threats. However, the suggestion did not follow a structured framework that 
could be incorporated as part of the business strategy and operations. The strategy of a 
well-balanced cybersecurity posture for small businesses depends on the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities to mitigate the most common and potentially harmful types of 
cyber-attacks (Baskerville et al., 2014).  
Baskerville et al. (2014) investigated the risk–safeguard relationship in several 
businesses when factoring risk assumptions. The perspectives of cybersecurity prevention 
and response paradigms provide valuable insight about cybersecurity strategic posture 
and the decision-making process. In essence, how assumptions and perceptions affect the 
relationship between risk and safeguards through the balance of prevention and response 
strategy. In this research study, this relationship between risk and cybersecurity activities 
refers to the level of preparedness given the ability to assess cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities (Sumner, 2009; Sun et al., 2011). Thus, this research study considered 
both the cybersecurity readiness and resilience of small businesses as an indicator of their 
cybersecurity postures. Table 3 provides a summary of select research studies specific to 
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The Construct of Decision Makers’ Perceived Risk of Cyber-attack 
According to Mejias and Balthazard (2014), common cyber threats include, but 
are not limited to, “viruses, network worms, trojan horses, denial of service (DoS) 
attacks, SQL injection, botnets, DNS attacks, virus hoaxes, steganography, cross-site 
scripting, and SCADA attacks” (p. 164). To measure small business decision makers’ 
perceived risk of common cyber-attacks effectively, this research study proposes using 
the classification types from the Ponemen Institute’s cybersecurity benchmark reports 
(Ponemon Institute, 2016, 2017, 2018). Sumner (2009) used cyber threat classifications 
in a similar manner following Whitman’s (2003) research, Sumner assessed risk by 
measuring the perceived impact and probability of threats. However, even the most recent 
threat categories, such as those identified by Whitman and Mattord (2015), are broadly 
focused on shifting threat types and do not specifically address the context of common 
cyber-attacks from a decision maker’s risk perception. This research study proposed 
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adopting the classifications of cyber-attacks so the data may be evaluated against actual 
reported incidents and trends. The important distinction between cyber threat and cyber-
attack is the materialization of a cyber threat (Mejias & Balthazard, 2014). Therefore, the 
classification types of cyber-attacks from the Ponemon Institute (2016, 2017, 2018) were 
used to provide familiarity to the small business decision maker as a frame of reference to 
the common cyber threats with the potential to cause severe financial consequences. The 
following 10 cyber-attack categories were briefly defined for the small business 
participants from the IS literature and presented to SMEs for approval. 
1. General malware – A wide variety of malicious software that is generally 
designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to a computer 
system (e.g., viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, ransomware, crimeware, logic 
bombs) (Hayes et al., 2012). 
2. Advanced malware/zero-day attack – Sophisticated malicious software that is 
engineered for a specific target and mission, such as breaching an organization 
(e.g., advanced persistent threats – the intruder establishes a discrete presence 
to mine data). A zero-day attack targets newly discovered system 
vulnerabilities when a patch has not yet been developed (Hurley et al., 2014). 
3. Compromised/stolen devices – Theft of equipment or information. Stolen 
devices contain information of value that is stored locally. Compromised 




4. Cross-site scripting – Placement of scripts into attacker-controlled, trusted and 
typically high-traffic websites in order to inject malicious client-side code on 
the visitor’s computers (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). 
5. Denial of services – Flooding the targeted network with traffic until it cannot 
respond or crashes, preventing access from legitimate users. In a distributed 
denial of service attack (DDoS), the incoming traffic flooding the victim 
originates from many different sources (Zobel & Khansa, 2012). 
6. Malicious insider – A malicious attack perpetrated by a person within the 
organization, such as an employee, former employee, contractor or business 
associate, who has privileged information concerning the organization’s 
security practices, data, and computer systems (Hunker & Probst, 2011; 
Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010). 
7. Phishing/social engineering – The use of human interaction to obtain 
information about a user, organization, or its computer systems to gain 
unauthorized access. Phishing is a type of social engineering to obtain 
sensitive information from individuals, usually by posing as a trustworthy 
entity (Hong, 2012). 
8. SQL injection – Targets data-driven applications and web forms by injecting 
Structured Query Language (SQL) code to gain unauthorized access to the 
back-end database and then extract content. 
9. Web-based attack – Sabotaging websites, probing vulnerabilities through 
web-connected resources, and exploiting Internet-connected devices to gain 
unauthorized access to a system or network. 
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10. Other – Any other cyber-attack not listed above (e.g., cyber 
extortion/espionage, miscellaneous errors, and payment skimmers). 
Boss (2007) measured perceived risk as a simple formula of perceived likelihood 
multiplied by perceived impact using a 5-point Likert scale. This method drew from 
Barki, Rivard, and Talbot (2001) by using their process to calculate the overall risk by 
multiplying the likelihood and impact scores together for each threat. The scale was 
defined as very low–moderate–very high for both impact and likelihood. In this research 
study, the scales for perceived likelihood used a 7-point Likert range from extremely low 
likelihood to extremely high likelihood. Likewise, the scales for perceived impact used a 
7-point Likert range from extremely low impact to extremely high impact. Both 
perceived likelihood and perceived impact was collected and multiplied for each of the 
cyber-attack types. The measurement of small business decision makers’ perceived risk 
of cyber-attack were calculated by multiplying the likelihood of the 10 common cyber-
attacks to small businesses listed above. The definitions for common cyber-attacks were 
presented and approved by the cybersecurity SMEs, as further discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Prospect Theory and Status Quo Bias 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory as an alternative to 
then-popular expected utility theory. Prospect theory challenged the axiom violations of 
utility theory to describe better how decisions are made under conditions of risk. This 
theory offered new insight into why nonoptimal decisions are made because they are 
framed in different ways. For example, when probabilities of a certain outcome are low, a 
decision is often made on a cognitive weighting function from the derived choices; the 
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“low probabilities are generally overweighed” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 281). The 
inverse is an underweighting of moderate and high probabilities—this is more 
pronounced in the decision weights of chance events and treating the prospect of highly 
unlikely events as impossible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The framing effect is a 
perceptive bias in a decision maker’s evaluation of options when presented with positive 
or negative semantics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Bazerman (1984) examined the 
core assumptions of prospect theory, including the effects of framing for individuals and 
organizational decision making. Bazerman (1984) found tendencies “to be risk averse in 
positively framed situations, while being risk seeking in negatively framed situations” (p. 
12). As Whyte (1986) pointed out, prospect theory provided a psychological explanation 
of this decision-making phenomena because it can be applied to the context of both 
failure and success, such as justifying a losing course of action through an escalation of 
commitment. Decisions based on framed circumstances, such as committing to a risk 
adverse outcome, also have potential for negative consequences if the decision maker 
justifies maintaining a current state of affair (status quo) when knowing of a significant 
problem or imminent threat. Figure 5 illustrates prospect theory in the decision-making 
process where the reference point is the intersect between the subjective value of the 





Figure 5. Prospect Theory in the Decision-Making Process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
1984). 
 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) introduced the framing effect of status quo 
bias to describe cognitive dissonance in the decision-making process. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991) recognized the relation between status quo bias and loss aversion, a 
significant feature associated with the value function in prospect theory that losses loom 
larger than gains. The alternative option of status quo implied that the decision maker 
would be indifferent between choices when presented with positive or negative outcomes. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) later developed a new version of prospect theory to 
explain the patterns of risk aversion and thereby extended the theory in several respects. 
Cumulative prospect theory added a weighting to the probability function of outcomes. 
The contributions of Tversky and Kahneman, particularly in the areas of cognitive bias, 
have provided a theoretical foundation for scientific advancement as well as a 
philosophical framework to explain decision-making under risk (Barberis, 2013; Shefrin 
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& Statman, 2003). Cumulative prospect theory and status quo bias, as well as many other 
heuristics and biases associated with prospect theory, have been widely adopted as a 
theoretical perspective in academic literature across disciplines (Lee & Joshi, 2016; 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
In IS literature, scholars have utilized the theoretical lens of prospect theory and 
status quo bias to describe many aspects of risk, including making decisions with 
conditions of uncertainty. For example, Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) examined the 
psychological commitment of status quo bias as the primary driver for users’ resistance to 
change during a new implementation of IS. This study examined the cognitive 
misperception of loss aversion for the evaluation and opposition of change as it related to 
perceived value of the expected outcomes. Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) used prospect 
theory to outline the levels of resistance from covert passive (ignoring or indifference) to 
overt active behaviors. From an economic perspective of IS security investments, Gordon 
and Loeb (2002) described a decision maker’s level of indifference as a risk-neutral, 
value-based proposition used in weighing “the probability of a threat occurring, and the 
vulnerability, defined in the model as the probability that a threat once realized (i.e., an 
attack) would be successful” (p. 440). Polites and Karahanna (2012) adopted status quo 
bias as the theoretical lens to study the habits associated with behavior-based inertia, 
influence perceptions, and intentions related to using a new system as well as resistance. 
Polites and Karahanna posited that switching costs, in terms of time and effort, impacts 
the rationalization to change from an incumbent system to a new system. One of their 
central arguments was that status quo bias could be used to explain the psychological 
commitment in the decision-making process when evaluating transition and sunk costs - 
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whether perceived or real (Polites & Karahanna, 2012). Polites and Karahanna explained 
perceived costs as a reluctance to switch based on skills and learned IS usage habits. 
Inertia was described as the “unwillingness to abandon the status quo irrespective of 
present alternatives or alternatives that may potentially become available in the future” 
(Polites & Karahanna, 2012, p. 24). Therefore, the first quadrant of the CyPRisT 
represents the decision maker’s level of indifference due to an unwillingness to abandon 
the status quo based on perceived or real switching costs. 
Liang and Xue (2009) applied cumulative prospect theory to explain the 
judgements that influence a decision of threat avoidance by examining the individual’s 
perceived level of threat severity. They referred to the value function for gains and losses, 
suggesting humans will approach avoidance behaviors through different evaluation 
processes and the assessment of undesirable end states. Liang and Xue (2009) also 
described the relationship between perceived susceptibility and perceived threat as a 
function of perceived severity. Perceived severity was defined as the “extent to which an 
individual perceives that negative consequences [are] caused by the malicious IT” (Liang 
& Xue, 2009, p. 80). For the context of this research study, perceived severity is 
interpreted as potential for loss or the perceived impact of risk. The concept represented 
in the second quadrant of the CyPRisT is a representation of the susceptibility–threat 
relationship. This also infers a risk-seeking behavior that is in contract to the third 
quadrant of risk aversion when considering the decision making of the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities. 
Osiyevskyy and Dewald (2015) investigated the judgement and critical strategic 
decisions of small business managers. They found strong support of biases in small 
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business managers’ decisions and their ‘need to act’. These strategic actions were 
intended to mitigate both noncritical threats of anticipated losses in revenue and critical 
threats “related to enormous losses that can lead to going out of business” (Osiyevskyy & 
Dewald, 2015, p. 1015). The cognitive framing effects were both impediments and 
inducement in the decision makers’ strategic choices. Small business managers relied on 
their judgment and heuristics when making strategic decisions. This was demonstrated 
when the choice to become risk averse is based on the perceived point of reference for 
cyber risk and loss aversion.  
Li, Liu, and Liu (2016) used the status quo bias framework along with other 
factors related to prospect theory to investigate loss aversion in the failures of knowledge 
management initiatives. Loss aversion had the highest influence in the relation between 
resistance behaviors over rational decision making (e.g., cost–benefit analysis of 
transition costs) and psychological commitment (i.e., social norms). Li et al. (2016) 
suggested status quo bias may explain why individuals are less likely to initiate changes 
voluntarily toward an improved system. Lee and Joshi’s (2016) comprehensive review of 
status quo bias perspective in IS literature further identified additional studies examining 
specific constructs such as cognitive bias and loss aversion. They argued an individual’s 
bias toward status quo is influenced by rational decision making (e.g., cost–benefit 
analysis), in addition to other psychological factors, but found weakness in the literature 
focusing mainly on cost–benefit analysis. Lee and Joshi (2016) recommended further 
examination of cognitive bias limitations that lead to bounded rational decisions based on 
the prospect theory constructs of loss aversion, resistance to change, framing and 
anchoring effects. Goel, Williams, and Dincelli (2017) applied framing of potential gains 
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or losses to evaluate human vulnerabilities (i.e., susceptibility to deceive). One of their 
hypotheses used prospect theory to explain decision making under uncertainty, 
suggesting people attach subjective values to weigh losses and gains.  
Overall, the review of prospect theory and status quo bias literature provides a 
theoretical foundation for the taxonomy quadrants of the CyPRisT. For example, the 
notions of threat appraisal, indifference, susceptibility to losses, and aversion, as well as 
strategic decision making may provide evidence of decision making affected by the 
heuristics of risk perceptions (Kahneman et al., 1991; Lee & Joshi, 2016; Liang & Xue, 
2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Table 4 provides a summary of relevant prospect 
theory and status quo bias literature. 
 
Table 4 
Summary of Relevant Prospect Theory and Status Quo Bias Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
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Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 


























principle of loss 
aversion from 




of change is 
assessed 









used on SQBP as 
insights into 
‘bias’ in human 
decision-making. 
Identified 
weaknesses in the 
major focus on 
rational cost-
benefit analysis 
Li et al., 2016 Instrument 
development 










and social norms 









Summary of Relevant Prospect Theory and Status Quo Bias Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
































that appraises the 
probability of 
losses (or failure) 






















system habit and 
































and the choice is 
risk-averse when 
they perceived 




Summary of What is Known and Unknown in the Research Literature 
A review of the literature was performed to provide an overview of the relevant 
topics of cybersecurity risk management, cybersecurity posture, and the constructs to be 
explored in this research study: cybersecurity preparedness and small business decision 
makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack. The literature provides examples of risk 
management frameworks; however, many publications assume organizations are 
sufficiently resourced to carry out the activities contained within the framework. Few 
researchers have examined risk management frameworks in the context of small 
businesses, considering their limited ability to deal with the risk of cyber-attacks (Berry 
& Berry, 2018). The growing adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework among 
small businesses warrants empirical assessment of cybersecurity posture based on how 
‘well-prepared’ the business is to prevent and protect against cyber threats, as well as 
their ability to maintain business continuity during and after a cyber-attack (Bodeau & 
Graubart, 2017; Hurley et al., 2014). Moreover, the development of an instrument is 
needed to measure the level of cybersecurity preparedness activities aiming to minimize 
cyber risk.  
The common cyber-attack vectors that threaten small businesses were reviewed in 
the literature as well as the leading cybersecurity benchmark reports. Researchers have 
suggested small business decision makers have difficulty in understanding their 
cybersecurity needs because their concerns are more focused on the general operations 
that provide revenue for the business. Small businesses are often inadequate in their 
ability to manage cybersecurity risk because they have fewer financial resources, have 
limited knowledge of cybersecurity threats, and/or lack the technical expertise to deal 
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with cyber-attacks (Hess & Cottrell, 2015; Osborn & Simpson, 2015; Paulsen, 2016). The 
literature provided evidence in the relationship between risk management activities and 
decision makers’ perceptions of threat (Rohn et al., 2016; Sumner, 2009). Adopting the 
theoretical lens of prospect theory may help to explain the calculus of weighting 
cybersecurity preparedness activities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore, the related perspective of status quo bias may help 
explain the passive resistance of indifference, risk-neutral posture, and the risk-
susceptible posture of knowingly favoring business profit to cyber risk (Gordon & Loeb, 
2002; Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009; Lee & Joshi, 2016; Li et al., 2016; Liang & Xue, 2009; 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Finally, the lens of prospect theory may also help 
explain the risk-averse posture to protect business IS assets by establishing strong 
cybersecurity controls, or exhibiting a high level of cybersecurity situational awareness to 
achieve an adequate balance between prevention and response strategies (Baskerville et 







Overview of Research Design 
This research study followed a multiphase developmental design utilizing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Clark & Ivankova, 2015; Creswell, Plano Clark, 
Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003; Ellis & Levy, 2009, 2010). The collection of both 
quantitative and qualitative data is appropriate in the development of a context-specific 
instrument that provides empirical measurement and observation (Creswell & Clark, 
2017). Mixed-methods research with qualitative and quantitative data collection has 
emerged as a popular approach in many disciplines, including the social sciences, 
because it allows for a broader perspective of a problem area and addresses the weakness 
of monomethod modes of inquiry (Creswell, 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
According to Clark and Ivankova (2015), a researcher may advance the application of 
mixed methods by intentionally intersecting one or more design methods. Therefore, the 
approach integrated the developmental phases to construct and validate a taxonomy for 
empirically assessing the cybersecurity postures of small businesses with a program 
intended to improve risk management though the implementation of cybersecurity 
preparedness activities. This research study was conducted in three phases to address the 
main research question: what cybersecurity preparedness activities from the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework can be used to assess and improve the cybersecurity posture of 
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a small business? Figure 6 presents an overview of the methodological process this 
research study followed. The phases and methods were sequential (Creswell & Clark, 
2017). 
 
Figure 6. An overview of the research design process to develop and validate the 
CyPRisT for empirical assessment of cybersecurity readiness and resilience, as well as 
the development of the cyberARMoRR strategy planning program to improve risk 




Developmental research studies are characteristically focused on problem solving 
with the purpose of bridging theory with practice (Ellis & Levy, 2010). In education, 
design and development research has been defined as “the systematic study of design, 
development, and evaluation processes with the aim of establishing an empirical basis for 
the creation of instructional and non-instructional products and tools and new or 
enhanced models that govern their development” (Richey & Klein, 2014, p. 1). In IS, 
scholars have used design science research to develop and improve IT artifacts (Gregor & 
Hevner, 2013; Hevner, 2007; Lee, Thomas, & Baskerville, 2015). Developmental 
research and design science research are similar in that they both involve the 
development of an artifact to address a research-worthy problem (Ellis & Levy, 2010).  
This study was grounded in developmental research in the creation of the 
CyPRisT to assess cybersecurity empirically in small businesses risk management as well 
as the cyberARMoRR program to help small businesses improve their cybersecurity 
postures. Ellis and Levy (2010) described developmental research as having four distinct 
characteristics: (a) systematic documentation of the process; (b) use of rigorous, accepted 
research methods; (c) empirical testing; and (d) communication of the results (p. 110). 
This research methodology followed a developmental approach in the creation of a new 
construct and research instrument, a taxonomy for evaluating cybersecurity posture and a 
cybersecurity program for small businesses. The expected practical contribution of the 
developmental research is to generate knowledge for examining or solving a problem that 
is also founded in theory to help explain some of the underlying causes related to the 
problem (Ellis & Levy, 2010). Accordingly, the foundation of this research study is 
72 
 
prospect theory and status quo bias in the development of the CyPRisT (Alharthi et al., 
2019; Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
Lee et al. (2016) defined an IS artifact as being formed when the three ‘unpacked’ 
artifacts (technology, information, and social) are brought together and interact. This 
research study incorporates the perspectives of Ellis and Levy (2010) as well as Lee et al. 
(2016) in the development of the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses as 
contributions in the form of artifacts using mixed methods of data collection. 
Specifically, this research study addressed the research problem through the development 
of an IS artifact (CyPRisT) and interacting social artifact (cyberARMoRR program for 
small businesses) that aim to provide information to “achieve a goal for individuals, 
groups, organizations, societies or other social units” (Lee et al., 2016, p. 25). The next 
section details the research method for the development of the IS artifacts as well as 
empirical assessment of cybersecurity readiness and resilience in small businesses. 
 
Specific Research Methods 
The research questions were answered through the three-phased developmental 
study using mixed methods of data collection (Creswell, 2014). Phase 1 was a structured 
process using the Delphi method to answer the questions posed in RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3. 
Phase 2 was a quantitative study to answer the questions posed in RQ4 and RQ5. Phase 3 
was a quasi-experimental study using the quantitative method to answer RQ6 and RQ7 
(Levy & Ellis, 2011), followed by a qualitative method to answer RQ8 (Saldaña, 2013). 
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The combination of data collection drew on the strengths of each method (Creswell & 
Clark, 2017). 
 
Research design – sequential exploratory (Phases 1 and 2) 
The research design for Phase 1 began with a structured process using the Delphi 
method to develop an instrument and taxonomy (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Skulmoski et 
al., 2007). Cybersecurity SMEs were recruited from the field of IS with qualifications and 
bona fide knowledge of the cybersecurity domain. This phase elicited data from the 
SMEs using the Delphi method to develop and validate the construct of cybersecurity 
preparedness as well as the common cyber threats to small businesses to measure 
decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The 
sequential exploratory design, as shown in Figure 7, used the structured process for the 
SME Delphi cycles to build the constructs of cybersecurity preparedness and decision 
makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack, and then quantitative methods to validate the 
instrument empirically. Phase 2 used the validated instrument to conduct a quantitative 
empirical assessment by collecting data from a sample population of small business 
decision makers (owners or managers) and documenting the results of the benchmark 
scores. The measures used in the quantitative data collection for the subgroup of 





Figure 7. The sequential exploratory design (Phase 1 and Phase 2) adopted from Creswell 
and Clark (2017). 
 
Research design – quasi-experimental (Phase 3) 
The research design of Phase 3 is a quasi-experiment that embeds a qualitative 
approach with the quantitative instrument to measure the cybersecurity postures of the 
participants (Levy & Ellis, 2011). As shown in Figure 8, the focus of Phase 3 was an 
intervention of the cyberARMoRR program for improving the cybersecurity postures and 
business continuity of the small businesses. Select volunteer participants from the 
previous phase were invited to participate in a pilot study. Following the pilot, additional 
small businesses were invited to participate in the cyberARMoRR program for small 
businesses. After participation in the cyberARMoRR program, the validated instrument 
was then used as a post measure to assess empirically the differences in small business 
cybersecurity preparedness and decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack. A 
qualitative inquiry using open-ended questions was used to evaluate the differences in 
cybersecurity postures as well as the small business owners’ reasons for change (or no 
change). Finally, the empirical findings as well as the patterns from the comparative 




Figure 8. The sequential embedded: Quasi-experimental Design (Phase 3) adopted from 
Creswell and Clark (2017). 
 
Figure 9 shows the overview of the developmental research design that combines 
the qualitative and quantitative data collection (Figures 7 and 8 combined). Represented 
by the dashed line, the SME validated instrument is the point of interface between the 
sequential exploratory design and the quasi-experimental design because it was used as a 
pretest and posttest measure of the small businesses’ cybersecurity postures. Creswell and 
Clark (2017) use upper- and lower-case letters to indicate which method is prioritized in 
the interpretation of the results. For example, the “QUAN(qual)” will place higher 
priority for analyzing differences in CyPRisT positions (RQ6, RQ7) than the qualitative 
inquiry (RQ8). The priority relates to the emphasis placed on each method of the study 
(Creswell & Clark, 2017). In this model of the embedded quasi-experiment methodology 
using mixed methods for data collection, the qualitative method is subservient data that 
used in service to the guiding approach (Creswell, 2014). Accordingly, a mixed-methods 
research design was selected because qualitative or quantitative methods alone would not 
answer all research questions. The sequential exploratory design was applied in the first 





Figure 9. Multiphase developmental research design integrating a sequential exploratory 
design with a sequential embedded intervention (quasi-experimental) design adopted 
from Creswell and Clark (2017). 
 
Participant Instrument Development 
A survey instrument was developed during Phase 1 consisting of two constructs: 
cybersecurity preparedness and decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack. The 
initial list of the cybersecurity preparedness activities was derived from the actionable 
objectives recommended in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1.1 with informative 
references to COBIT and the ISO/IEC 27000 standards (NIST, 2018). These activities 
also correspond to the fundamentals of information security for small businesses and 
recommendations provided in extent literature (Berry & Berry, 2018; Paulsen & Toth, 
2016; Rohn et al., 2016). The next two sections discuss the specific approach for 
developing the survey instrument and measures that were used to assess each of the 
constructs. The two sections are organized by quantitative and qualitative measures. The 




Quantitative survey instrument and measure 
The phases of the sequential exploratory and quasi-experiment design in this 
research study were predominantly quantitative (Creswell et al., 2003). The construct of 
cybersecurity preparedness was developed through a literature review of theoretical and 
empirical studies and then validated using SMEs. The construct consisted of an 
inventory-based measure of the prioritized cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and 
references for the small businesses to manage cybersecurity risk, as guided by the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2018; Paulsen & Toth, 2016). Data were collected 
from a target sample of 15 SMEs, conducting multiple Delphi rounds during Phase 1 
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Skinner et al., 2015). Thus, to minimize the probability of 
low response rates, 35 SMEs were invited to participate in the Delphi rounds. SMEs who 
possess the required credentials and experience were contacted through email or social 
media private messaging. Using the Delphi method, the SMEs reviewed and provided 
feedback on the set of cybersecurity preparedness activities from the five functions of the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2018; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). After consensus 
from the SMEs on the approved set of cybersecurity preparedness activities for small 
businesses, the SMEs were then asked to provide an importance weight using a 7-point 
Likert scale that was assessed for the hierarchal aggregation of the measure. 
The construct of perceived risk was adapted from the work of Sumner (2009) and 
Whitman (2003) then contextually updated with the common cyber-attacks recognized in 
the cybersecurity benchmark reports known to present significant threats small 
businesses. The construct measured the small business decision makers’ perceived risk 
for each of the cyber-attacks using a 7-point Likert scale of perceived impact and 
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perceived likelihood (i.e., probability of an occurrence). This research study developed 
the instrument using feedback from the SMEs on the construct items of cybersecurity 
preparedness activities and the types of cyber-attacks. The survey instrument be validated 
by the same SMEs using the Delphi method (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Ramim & 
Lichvar, 2014). An iterative process of the Delphi method through online surveys was 
used to validate both measures of the cybersecurity preparedness and the decision 
makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack (Skulmoski et al., 2007). The SME data were also 
used to validate the topics to align content of the cyberARMoRR program for small 
businesses based on the final approved measures of cybersecurity preparedness and 
decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack.  
Phase 2 utilized the previously validated and weighted constructs of cybersecurity 
preparedness and decision makers’ perceived risk of cyber-attack in a survey instrument. 
An anonymous survey was administered to small business decision makers across the 
U.S. The small business decision makers were invited through email and social media via 
business networking groups. A link to the recruitment letter was also shared to small 
business owner groups on social networking platforms such as LinkedIn and Facebook. 
To extend recruiting efforts, additional participants were targeted through email to 
increase participation rate small business contact information. The email addresses of 
small businesses were retrieved from public records data sources such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, U.S. Small Business Administration, and state business filling directories, as 
well as advertising publications such as Yellow Pages (online). 
The data collected from this study was quantitatively analyzed and applied to the 
CyPRisT. The small business participants were invited through email and social media 
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via business networking groups. The measures used in quantitative data collection during 
Phase 2 became the premeasure for the willing participants in Phase 3. Following the 
quantitative data collection, a purposeful selection of small business decision makers 
were invited to participate in a review of the pilot program to test the semi-structured 
interview protocol (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). This process ensured adequate 
preparation of the key questions and safeguards regarding the confidentiality of the small 
businesses when conducting interviews with the sample (Myers & Newman, 2007). 
Feedback from the review was used to ensure any concerns have been addressed and the 
program content aligns with the topics of the SME-approved measure. The Phase 3 
posttest survey was made available for the participants to measure changes in security 
posture. A posttest survey reminder were sent to the consenting participants’ email 
addresses 30 days after launching the CyberARMoRR program. The same SME-
approved quantitative questions were used for the posttest measure. The data collected 
was used to analyze the differences between the pretest and posttest quantitative 
measures. 
 
Qualitative Survey Instrument and Measure 
The semi-structured interview “is a qualitative data collection strategy in which 
the researcher asks informants a series of predetermined but open-ended questions” 
(Given, 2008, p. 810). The following questions were used in the interviews with small 
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business decision makers during the Phase 3 pilot of this research study. These questions 
are open-ended to form the basis of the interviews with voluntary participants. 
1. What cybersecurity preparedness activities have helped improve the cybersecurity 
posture of your small business as a result of the cyberARMoRR program? 
2. For each of the NIST functions, what cybersecurity preparedness activities are 
challenging for your small business? 
3. Are any of the resources in the program difficult to follow? 
4. What would you change about the cyberARMoRR program? 
The posttest survey instrument also included a qualitative question after each of the five 
sections of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, and Recover. The question for each section is: “Do any of the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities listed above present a challenge to implement for your small 
business? Please explain why. (“N/A” if none)”. The posttest, open-ended, qualitative 
questions in the survey instrument and voluntary semi-structured interviews with the 
participants were combined to address RQ8 (Creswell, 2014; Myers & Newman, 2007). 
The qualitative evaluation of the SME weighted activities were assessed using thematic 
analysis techniques for the combined responses (Saldaña, 2013). 
 
Validity and Reliability 
According to Straub (1989), literature reviews and panels of experts can provide 
content validity as well as construct validity for an instrument. Straub (1989) stated 
“instrument validation should precede other core empirical validities” (p. 150). For this 
research study, internal validity was established through the use of the experts. 
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Instrument validation and reliability may be established by sequencing a qualitative 
technique of exploratory research, followed by a quantitative empirical technique and 
then conceptual refinements (Straub, 1989). Therefore, to ensure the overall validity of 
the instrument, Phase 1 of this research study solicited the help of SMEs using the Delphi 
method (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). A qualified expert had academic or professional 
experience, and at least one professional certification in the fields of information security. 
Example certifications include: Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), Certified Information 
Security Manager (CISM), Certified IS Security Professional (CISSP), Security+, and 
Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC).  
The Delphi method is a widely accepted and flexible method to advance scientific 
knowledge together with the IS body of knowledge (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; 
Skulmoski et al., 2007). The Delphi method “is an iterative process to collect and distill 
the anonymous judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis 
techniques interspersed with feedback” (Skulmoski et al., 2007, p. 1). Thus, the Delphi 
method contributed to construct validity (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Ramim & Lichvar, 
2014).  
The reliability of the instrument refers to the consistency, accuracy, and stability 
across the unit of measure (Straub, 1989). Straub (1989) also stated “internal validity 
raises the question of whether the observed effects could have been caused by or 
correlated with a set of unhypothesized and/or unmeasured variables” (p. 151). An 
iterative process was used to evaluate the measurement properties of the instrumentation. 
This iterative process led to increased instrument reliability and validity (Onwuegbuzie, 
Bustamante, & Nelson, 2010).  
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External validity refers to the extent that a research study is generalizable across 
types of persons, settings, or times (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In Phase 1 of this research 
study, data were analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha to assess the construct reliability of the 
measured constructs (Cronbach, 1951). The results of the Cronbach’s analysis should 
indicate that all constructs provided very high reliability (greater than .70). The Phase 2 
analysis verified that the data of this study had a good representation of small businesses 
populations. The demographic variables (industry, number of employees, years in 
operation, annual revenue, and IT budget) was compared with findings in the extant 
literature on small business cybersecurity as well as recent cybersecurity benchmark 
reports. Finally, both qualitative and quantitative measures were used with a pilot to 
ensure appropriateness of the assessment and semi-structured interviews (Onwuegbuzie 
et al., 2010). The questions for semi-structured interviews for RQ8 were vetted in the 
pilot to minimize any irregularities or problems with the collections of qualitative data. 
The pilot was administered to ensure the validity of the semi-structured interview 




The population and sample size for this research study varies by phase and 
research design method. The sequential exploratory design, Phase 1 and Phase 2, consists 
of the Delphi method using a panel of cybersecurity experts for validating constructs as 
well as instrument development, then a quantitative survey. Skulmoski et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that a Delphi population in research often varies greatly in both size and the 
83 
 
number of rounds. For example, studies have ranged from 4–171 experts with 1–6 rounds 
of interaction (Skulmoski et al., 2007). However, Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) 
recommended 10–18 experts on a Delphi panel. Skinner et al. (2015) also recommended 
that panels range from 10–30 SMEs. Therefore, this research study targeted participation 
from 15 cybersecurity SMEs with at least two rounds of interaction. A qualified SME 
having academic or professional experience and at least one professional certification in 
the field of cybersecurity. The SMEs were over the age of 18 to participate in this 
research study. 
Phase 2 of this research study approached more than 200 small businesses in the 
U.S. to ensure an appropriate sample size (Mertler & Reinhardt, 2017). This research 
study included any small business owners or managers as participants. A small business 
is a privately owned and operated entity that typically has a very small number of 
employees. The recruitment survey aimed to collect data from very small businesses, 
such as those with 10–50 employees. However, small businesses not meeting this size 
constraint were not excluded from voluntary participation or receiving the benefit of the 
cyberARMoRR program. A small business owner is the individual who owns a small 
business and is responsible for all the risks and rewards of his or her business venture. A 
small business manager is an individual who manages a small business on behalf of an 
owner. The participants’ age was set to 18 or older.  
The participants were given the opportunity to opt-in to the next phase. If consent 
was provided, the email was used to invite to participate in the quasi-experiment (single 
group, Phase 2 survey as the pretest and Phase 3 survey as the posttest). The Phase 3 
quasi-experimental pretest-posttest single group design required data collection from the 
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same instrument (Salkind, 2010). Therefore, the comparative analysis was used in the 
development of the instrument for this research study during Phase 1 for the sample of 
small businesses participating in Phase 2 (Salkind, 2010). However, the test group was 
limited to the number of small business decision makers willing to continue participation 
in Phase 3 of this research study. Creswell and Clark (2017) stated it is acceptable for 
follow-up qualitative data collection to have a smaller sample than the quantitative data 
collection. Thus, it was anticipated that Phase 3 would include a small group size of 
approximately 40 small businesses. 
 
Data Collection 
Data were collected using a sequential series of three phases. In Phase 1, the 
SMEs were recruited via email of personal and professional contacts in 
cybersecurity/information security field (see Appendix B). Data collection consisted of a 
qualitative survey instrument to identify the cybersecurity preparedness activities, 
weights by functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and descriptions of the 
common cyber-attacks on small businesses (see Appendix C). The second Delphi round 
consisted of further validation of the cybersecurity preparedness activities, weighting 
each by importance using a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix D). A qualitative 
assessment of the selected topics using highest-rated cybersecurity activities was used in 
the assessment of the CyPRisT as well as the development of the cyberARMoRR 
program. 
In Phase 2, small business owners and managers were recruited through public 
listings of business emails, small business networking groups, and social media groups 
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(see Appendix F). The participants were presented with the option to provide their 
informed consent to participate in the quasi-experiment or complete the initial survey 
anonymously. The online consent form (see Appendix G) provided the necessary 
information to participate in both Phase 2 and Phase 3 surveys without linking the 
participant to their responses. The SME-approved survey instrument was used to collect 
data from the participants in Phase 2 as a pretest measure (see Appendix H). The SME-
approved survey instrument was used to collect data from the participants in Phase 3 as a 
posttest measure with the addition of a qualitative question on each of the functions (see 
Appendix K). To protect privacy, the participant survey responses were anonymous. No 
personal or private information was collected. The aggregated data were connected using 
a system generated ID that was randomly assigned to the participant upon submitting the 
informed consent form. 
 
Data Analysis 
Levy (2006) described pre-analysis data screening as “the process of detecting 
irregularities or problems with the collected data” (p. 150). This process is required 
before the data analysis to ensure that results and conclusions to be valid (Mertler & 
Reinhardt, 2017). First, to ensure construct validity, SMEs were used to conduct a 
prescreening of the instrument for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3. The data collected from the 
SMEs were used in the development of the instrument. For RQ1, the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework was used to determine which cybersecurity preparedness activities, organized 
by the five functions, were used to measure the level of cybersecurity preparedness for a 
small business. The SME-approved set of cybersecurity activities were identified through 
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at least two Delphi rounds. The SMEs’ recommended revisions in Delphi 1 were 
presented for approval in Delphi 2. For RQ2, in Delphi 1 the SMEs provided weights to 
the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. In Delphi 2, the SMEs 
provided data indicating the importance of each of the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities. These data were analyzed and used in the development of the aggregate 
benchmark score for levels of preparedness. For RQ3, also using the Delphi method, a set 
of cyber-attack vectors were presented for the SMEs to provide feedback. These 
definitions were contextually updated to address the most common cyber threats to small 
businesses. The SME feedback from the Delphi 1 survey example (see Appendix C) was 
analyzed and presented in Delphi 2 (see Appendix D) to achieve consensus on the set of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities and common cyber-attacks that were used in the 
survey instrument (see Appendix E, Appendix H – pretest, and Appendix K - posttest). 
In Phase 2, the survey instrument was used to collect data from 216 small 
business participants. For RQ4, the benchmark scores were applied to the CyPRisT to 
assess the cybersecurity posture level positions of the 216 small businesses. Following 
the process recommended by Mertler and Reinhard (2017), RQ5 and RQ6 pre-analysis 
data screening was performed to verify that data collected from the survey do not contain 
any missing or out of range values. Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) was used to 
evaluate the reliability of each of the constructs. For RQ5, data were analyzed using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures. For RQ6, the data were analyzed using paired 
sample t-test procedures. 
In Phase 3, semi-structured interview questions during the pilot launch of the 
cyberARMoRR program was assessed to minimize any irregularities or problems with 
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the program content. The pilot was administered to ensure the validity program topics 
before undertaking research with the remaining participants (Gibson & Brown, 2009). 
For RQ7, differences between groups were quantitatively assessed using descriptive 
statistics while differences in the CyPRisT positions were qualitatively assessed. For 
RQ8, data were collected from the qualitative open-ended questions for each of the five 
functions on the posttest survey as well as the field notes from the semi-structured 
interviews. The qualitative data were analyzed following a two-cycle process of manually 
coding categories and emergent themes from the voluntary participant responses 
(Saldaña, 2013). Thus, the survey frequency counts using magnitude coding and open-
ended questions as well as semi-structured response data were evaluated using a 
descriptive coding process (a.k.a. topic coding) (Saldaña, 2013). Pattern coding helped 
identify the emergent themes for the most challenging cybersecurity preparedness 
activities. Content analysis of thematic categories, such as patterns of participants’ 
reported problems encountered within each of the functions, were analyzed to provide 
meaningful explanation (see Appendix L).  
 
Resources 
The Nova Southeastern University online library of databases were used to gather 
research articles for the literature review. As human subjects were involved, IRB 
approval was received prior to conducting the research (see Appendix A). This research 
study required access to the Internet, the use of email, and the use of a web browser to 
engage the SMEs in the field of cybersecurity for instrument development following the 
Delphi method. Small business owners and managers were solicited to complete an 
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Internet-based survey that was developed using Google Forms. A list of small business 
email contacts was retrieved from public records data sources such as the U.S. Small 
Business Administration and state business filing directories. The survey link and 
participation request letter were shared to small business social groups on social 
networking platforms such as LinkedIn and Facebook. Survey respondents voluntarily 
provided their contact information to receive invitation to participate in the subsequent 
phases of this research study. Participants were assured of their anonymity and no 
personal data were collected. Additionally, business owners and managers were assured 
that their responses related to business data were used in aggregate form only for the 
purposes of this research. IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SSPS) and 
Microsoft Excel was used to analyze the quantitative data. Various online resources were 
also referenced for administering the cyberARMoRR program to small business decision 
makers, such as public domain online videos, cybersecurity self-assessment tools, and 
electronic and printable materials with references to government guides. 
 
Summary 
This research followed a multiphase developmental design utilizing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to construct and validate the CyPRisT for 
empirically assessing the cybersecurity postures of small businesses. Additionally, the 
cyberARMoRR program was developed with the intent to improve risk management by 
providing educational resources on the implementation of cybersecurity preparedness 
activities. The development of these artifacts was the driver for the new construct, 
cybersecurity preparedness, which was validated by SMEs and included in the survey 
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instrument for empirical assessment. This chapter also discussed the methods to address 
the specific research goals and research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Phase 1 followed 
a qualitative research design and data collection by eliciting SME feedback using the 
Delphi method toward the development of the instrument for subsequent phases. Phase 2 
followed a quantitative research design utilizing a survey instrument and exploratory 
analysis techniques. The survey instrument served as a pretest measure in a quasi-
experiment. Phase 3 provided participants access to the cyberARMoRR consisting of the 
topics approved by the SMEs in the development of the instrument. Afterward, the 
instrument approved by the SMEs was again used as a posttest measure with the addition 
of a qualitative component. As a result, the multiphase approach integrated the 
developmental phases to construct and validate the taxonomy for empirically assessing 
the cybersecurity postures of small businesses with a program intended to improve risk 







This chapter presents the results of the data collection and data analysis performed 
by this research study. The main goal was to develop and validate a small business 
Cybersecurity Preparedness-Risk Taxonomy (CyPRisT) to assess empirically the 
cybersecurity posture of small businesses as well as administer a program that can assist 
in improving small business decision maker’s cyber risk management. In Phase 1, the 
results are presented for the two Delphi surveys using a panel of cybersecurity experts. 
The SMEs validated a set of cybersecurity preparedness activities based on the five 
functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, identified weights for the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities, and approved a set of cyber-attacks that are common threats to 
small businesses. The results show how small businesses are positioned on the CyPRisT 
using their Cybersecurity Preparedness Scores (CPSs) and the Decision Maker’s 
Perceived Risk of Cyber-attack (DMPRCA) as well as a statistical analysis of the data by 
business and participant demographics. The differences in cybersecurity posture before 
and after participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses, changes in 
cybersecurity preparedness activities, and the challenges for the small businesses for 
improving their cybersecurity posture. This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
results of this study for all phases. 
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Phase 1 – Subject Matter Expert (SME) Panel 
To answer RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3, a survey instrument was developed during Phase 
1 then sent to a panel of qualified cybersecurity SMEs to validate a set of cybersecurity 
preparedness activities for small business. The initial set of cybersecurity preparedness 
activities were derived from the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST, 2018; Paulsen & Toth, 2016). Direct email invitations were sent to 35 qualified 
cybersecurity SMEs. A total of 22 cybersecurity SMEs agreed to participate and 
submitted their feedback during multiple rounds of surveys. Therefore, the response rate 
of the expert panel was about 62.8%. The cybersecurity SMEs assigned weights to each 
of the cybersecurity preparedness activities. Furthermore, the SMEs approved a set of 
common cyber threats to small businesses for measuring perceived risk (perceived 
likelihood x perceived impact). 
 
Phase 1 – SME Panel Characteristics 
The panel of cybersecurity SMEs was comprised of ranking members of 
cybersecurity organizations such as the NIST, InfraGard, and Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (ISACA), as well as highly esteemed professors and scholars in 
the field of cybersecurity and information security. The panel experts were also targeted 
for having relevant experience advising various small businesses on cybersecurity 





Descriptive Statistics of the SMEs (N=22) 
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For gender, majority of the SMEs were male (18; 81.82%). For age, majority of 
the SMEs were aged 40 to 49 years old (7; 31.82%) and 50 to 59 years old (8; 36.36%). 
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For higher academic degree, all except one of the SMEs have a graduate degree (21; 
95.45%). For professional role, 9 (40.91%) SMEs were in a senior role in the 
cybersecurity/information security industry, 7 (31.82%) SMEs were in academia, and 6 
(27.27%) SMEs were in both academia and professional. In terms of experience in the 
field of cybersecurity/information security, more than half of the SMEs have 16 to 20 
years (6; 27.27%) and 21 years or more (7; 31.82%) of experience. For cybersecurity 
certifications, the majority of SMEs one or more (20; 90.91%) cybersecurity certification. 
An exception was made for 2 SMEs on the cybersecurity certification qualification due to 
their esteemed reputation in the field of cybersecurity/information security (proven by 
publications and senior level experience). 
 
Phase 1 – Data Collection (Delphi Method) 
The data collection for Phase 1 utilized the Delphi Method (Ramim & Lichvar, 
2014; Skinner et al., 2015). Data collection occurred between August 2019 and 
September 2019 using two survey instruments to receive feedback from the cybersecurity 
SMEs. A Google Form was used to present the survey instrument to the SMEs. The first 
round of Delphi method consisted of questions organized by each function of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (see Appendix C). The SMEs were asked to Keep, Adjust, or 
Remove questions for each of the five functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and 
Recover. Open text fields were provided for recommended adjustments and additional 
questions to be included in the set of cybersecurity preparedness activities for small 
businesses. Descriptions were also provided for 10 types of common cyber-attacks on 
small businesses that was used to measure the decision maker's perceived risk (Ponemon 
94 
 
Institute, 2018). Overall, the SMEs’ feedback was positive and, based on the 
recommendations, revisions were made to the survey instrument to conduct the next 
round of survey questions.  
The second round of survey questions consisted of a revised set of questions (see 
Appendix D). The SMEs were asked to provide a level of importance for each question 
using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) “Not at all important” to (7) “Extremely 
important” to calculate weights of the cybersecurity preparedness activities. Open text 
fields were provided for any final recommendations to adjust the questions. The revised 
set of common cyber-attack definitions were provided to the cybersecurity SMEs in the 
same survey. Again, open text fields were offered for any final recommendations to 
adjust the definitions. The instrument was finalized with expert consensus of set of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities based on the high level of importance as well as 
minimal feedback to open questions (see Appendix E). 
 
Phase 1 – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
The pre-analysis data screening did not identify any SME responses that needed 
to be removed. Also, there were no incomplete data sets submitted because all survey 
items were set to ‘required’ when developing the instrument. Instrument validation was 
addressed by having the SMEs screen the survey for representative questions (content 
validity) before other empirical validities (Straub, 1989). The expert panel using the 
Delphi method also assisted with the stability of the individual measures (construct 




Phase 1 – Data Analysis 
For RQ1, the SMEs approved a set of cybersecurity preparedness activities 
derived from the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (2018) and the 
small business information security fundamentals (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). There were 70 
cybersecurity preparedness activities that were approved and translated into question 
items for the participant surveys. The final approved set consisted of 20 question items 
for the function Identify (ID), 20 question items for the function Protect (PR), 10 question 
items for the function Detect (DE), 10 question items for the function Respond (RS), and 
10 question items for the function Recovery (RC).  
For RQ2, the SMEs identified weights for each of the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities to enable an aggregation score to benchmark the level of preparedness for a 
small business. The weights were used to generate an overall Cybersecurity Preparedness 
Scores (CPSs). In order to conduct an appropriate comparison, due to differences in 
quantity of the question items for the five functions, the weighted scores were normalized 
using an aggregate sum of 0 to 5, as depicted in the formula below. 
𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑠 (0 𝑡𝑜 5) =  (
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Whereas, Ws are the SMEs' mean level of importance (weights). The Ws are 
multiplied by the participant response for each cybersecurity preparedness activity 
(0=No; 1=Yes) to sum each function. For example, the Identify (ID) function was 
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calculated by using the Likert value (1-7) for each item multiplied by the corresponding 
participant response (0-1), the next item were calculated to sum the 20 items within the 
ID function (max 7x20=140). The five functions were normalized to total one (1) each 
maximum value (representing 100%). For example, the interval for ID is 0-140 range 
from the lowest possible score of 0 (no responses to all cybersecurity preparedness 
activities) to the highest possible score of one (100%) within the function (yes responses 
to all cybersecurity preparedness activities multiple by the normalization factor). Similar 
calculations and normalizations where done for all five functions and then added all five 
functions to the resulting CPSs scores from 0 to 5. 
Descriptive statistics were used to address RQ2 by summarizing the scores of the 
assigned importance weights of each of the cybersecurity preparedness activities. Central 
tendency measures of mean and standard deviation were also used to summarize the data 
since the importance weights are continuous measured. Table 6 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics for the importance weights of the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities in each of the five functions. The results show the mean score of the assigned 
importance weights for the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework of 
identify (M= 6.25; SD = 0.26), protect (M= 6.45; SD = 0.35), detect (M= 6.16; SD = 
0.31), respond (M= 6.34; SD = 0.28), and recover (M= 6.08; SD = 0.48) were between 
the range of the scales for (6) very important and (7) extremely important. The minimum 
and maximum range from high to extremely high for the importance rating of the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities within all five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity 





Descriptive Statistics of Importance Weights for the Cybersecurity Preparedness 
Activities in the Five Functions of NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
  N of Items Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Wid 20 5.64 6.77 6.25 0.26 
Wpr 20 5.82 6.82 6.45 0.35 
Wde 10 5.68 6.55 6.16 0.31 
Wrs 10 5.95 6.68 6.34 0.28 
Wrc 10 5.27 6.77 6.08 0.48 
 
For RQ3, the SMEs approved a set of cyber-attack vectors which address the most 
common cyber threats to a small business. The Ponemen Institute (2016, 2017, 2018) has 
been consistently reporting 10 types of common cyber-attack on small businesses. The 
SMEs adopted these for the measure of perceived risk that was calculated by multiplying 
perceived likelihood (PL) by perceived impact (PI) using a 7-point Likert scale from 
extremely low to extremely high. Moreover, the SMEs provided simple definitions to 
each type of cyber-attack for the participants as reference within the instrument. The 
overall score for Decision Makers’ Perceived Risk of Cyber-Attack (DMPRCA) is 
depicted in the formula below. 
𝐷𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐴 (𝑖𝑛 %) =  (
1
490





Whereas PL and PI both range from 1 to 7 each (Likert scale), resulting in 
DMPRCA range of 0%-100%. The DMPRCA was calculated for each item using the 
Likert value (PL x PI) having a max score of 49 for the item (7x7). Thereby, 490 is the 
total max possible score for the 10 categories of cyber-attacks representing 100%. 
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Phase 2 – Sequential Exploratory 
A sequential exploratory study was conducted to validate the survey from Phase 1 
as well answer RQ4 and RQ5. Data were collected from a sample population of small 
business decision makers (owners or managers) to document the results of the benchmark 
scores. The CPSs and DMPRCA were used to further validate the instrument. The scores 
were then used to assess the position on the CyPRisT then identify differences by (a) 
industry, (b) number of employees, (c) years in operation, (d) annual revenue, and (e) IT 
budget, as well as personal demographics indicators of (f) role, (g) age, (h) gender, and 
(i) education. The measures of CPSs and DMPRCA used in the quantitative data 
collection became the pretest for participants that were willing to volunteer continuing 
with Phase 3 of this research study. 
 
Phase 2 – Data Collection 
Data collection occurred between September 2019 and October 2019. The 
participants of the survey were owners and managers from across the U.S. Google Forms 
was used to present the survey instrument to the participants (see Appendix H). An 
option was offered to participate anonymously or to complete an informed consent form 
(see Appendix G). Those completing the informed consent form were advised that they 
would receive and invitation to participate in the cyberARMoRR program for the next 
phase of this study approximately 1 month after submitting the initial survey. A total of 




Phase 2 – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
Pre-analysis data screening is a process of detecting irregularities or problems 
with data collection to ensure data to be analyze is accurate and reliable (Levy, 2006). 
The invitations to small businesses were not limited to business size or any other 
demographic. This ensured that any small business owner or manager could participate in 
the survey and gain access to the CyberARMoRR program resources. However, because 
the scope of the research was delimited, the survey instrument was designed to filter 
those small businesses having between 10 and 49 full time employees. Accordingly, 54 
cases were removed for being out of scope - having less than 10 full-time employees, 50-
99 full-time employees, and 100 or more full-time employees. Prior to conducting the 
main analyses to address RQ4 and RQ5, the presence of multivariate outliers was first 
investigated using IBM’s SPSS Statistics software tools. Outliers can be detected by 
Mahalanobis Distance procedure (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017). The data were tested for 
normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. The KS test showed that the 
empirical distribution of the Mahalanobis distance corresponds to the exact distribution 
since the result was insignificant (KS(216) = 0.04, p = 0.20) based on a significance of 
0.05. Thus, the result indicated that no multivariate outliers were detected and the final 
sample size for analysis in this study was 216. 
 
Phase 2 – Participant Demographics Characteristics 
The 216 small business participants varied by business demographics and 
personal demographics; industry (BD1), size – number of employees (BD2), years in 
operation (BD3), annual revenue (BD4), IT budget (BD5), and role (PD1), age (PD2), 
gender (PD3), and education (PD4). The sample of small business participants were fairly 
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distributed across the demographics. The highest for the industry demographic were other 
(13%), professional services (11%) and retail (10%). The lowest for the industry 
demographic were transportation (2%); and warehousing, logistics, and distribution (2%). 
The highest for the size demographic were 10 to 19 full time employees (34%) and 20 to 
29 full time employees (28%). The lowest for the size demographic were 30 to 39 full 
time employees (17%), and 40 to 49 full time employees (20%). The highest for the years 
in operation demographic were 5 to 9 years (31%) and 10 to 14 years (18%). The lowest 
for the years in operation demographic were greater than 40 years (8%) and 15-19 years 
(9%). The highest for the annual revenue demographic were $1M to $4.9M (37%) and 
$500K to $999K (24%). The lowest for the annual revenue demographic were greater 
than $20M (<1%) and less than 100K (2%). The highest for the IT budget demographic 
were 7% to 10% (31%) and 3% to 6% (28%). The lowest for the IT budget demographic 
were greater than 10% (5%) and less than 1% (15%). The role demographic was nearly 
even. The highest for the age demographics were 30 to 39 years (45%) and 40 to 49 years 
(20%). The lowest for the age demographics were greater than 70 years (<1%) and less 
than 20 years (1%). The gender demographic was nearly even. Finally, the highest for the 
education demographic were bachelor’s degree (37%) and graduate level degrees (31%). 
The lowest for the education demographic were less than high school diploma (1%) and 






Descriptive Statistics of the Participant Responses (N=216) 
Demographic Item N % 
Industry: 
1. Agriculture & Food Services 
2. Banking & Financial Services 
3. Communications, Entertainment, Media, & Publishing 
4. Construction & Real Estate 
5. Education & Research 
6. Energy & Utilities 
7. Healthcare Services & Pharmaceuticals 
8. Hospitality 
9. Industrial & Manufacturing Consumer Goods/Products 
10. Information Technology & Software 
11. Professional Services 
12. Repair & Installation Services 
13. Retail 
14. Transportation 





































2. 10-19 full-time employees 
3. 20-29 full-time employees 
4. 30-39 full-time employees 











Years in Operation: 
1. Less than 1 year 
2. 1-4 years 
3. 5-9 years 
4. 10-14 years 
5. 15-19 years 
6. 20-39 years 


















1. Less than $100K 
2. $100K to $249K 
3. $250K to $499K 
4. $500K to $999K 
5. $1M to $4.9M 
6. $5M to $20M 





















Descriptive Statistics of the Participant Responses (N=216) (continued) 
Demographic Item N % 
IT Budget: 
1. Less than 1% 
2. 1% - 2% 
3. 3% - 6% 
4. 7% - 10% 























1. Less than 20 years 
2. 20 to 29 years 
3. 30 to 39 years 
4. 40 to 49 years 
5. 50 to 59 years 
6. 60 to 69 years 



























1. Less than high school diploma 
2. High school diploma or equivalent 
3. Some college, no degree 
4. Associate degree 
5. Bachelor’s degree 
6. MBA or master’s degree 


















Phase 2 – Additional Instrument Validation and Reliability 
After pre-screening data, descriptive statistics were used to further validate the 
approved set of cybersecurity preparedness activities from RQ1. The results for the 
central tendency measures of mean and standard deviation were evaluated by obtaining 
the number of the cybersecurity preparedness activities in each of the five functions of 
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the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the 
approved set of cybersecurity preparedness activities.  
For the identify function, the mean number of yes responses was 9.83 (SD = 5.59) 
out of the 20 question items. The mean showed that the samples of small businesses have 
an almost half or 49.2% approved set of cybersecurity preparedness activities in the 
identify function which is the function that helps increase an organization’s 
understanding of their resources and risks. For the protect function, the mean number of 
yes responses was 11.66 (SD = 4.91) out of the 20 question items. The mean showed that 
the samples of small businesses have more than half or 58.3% approved set of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities in the protect function which is the function that 
supports the ability to limit or contain the impact of a potential information or 
cybersecurity event. For the detect function, the mean number of yes responses was 4.84 
(SD = 2.73) out of the 10 question items. The mean showed that the samples of small 
businesses have an almost half or 48.43% approved set of cybersecurity preparedness 
activities in the detect function which is the function that enables timely discovery of 
information security or cybersecurity events. For the respond function, the mean number 
of yes responses was 4.53 (SD = 3.04) out of the 10 question items. The mean showed 
that the samples of small businesses have an almost half or 45.3% approved set of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities in the respond function which is the function that 
supports the ability to contain or reduce the impact of an event. For the recover function, 
the mean number of yes responses was 5.19 (SD = 2.64) out of the 10 question items. 
The mean showed that the small businesses have half or 51.9% approved set of 
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cybersecurity preparedness activities in the recover function which is the function that 
helps an organization resume normal operations after an event.  
 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics of Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities in the Five Functions of 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (N=216) 
Cybersecurity 
Preparedness Activities 
N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Identity (ID) 216 0 20 9.83 5.59 
Protect (PR) 216 0 20 11.66 4.91 
Detect (DE) 216 0 10 4.84 2.73 
Respond (RS) 216 0 10 4.53 3.04 
Recover (RC) 216 0 10 5.19 2.64 
 
Additionally, for RQ1, the question items used to collect cybersecurity 
preparedness activities for the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework were 
evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability. Measures that demonstrate a 
reliability score over 0.70 using Cronbach’s Alpha are considered reliable (Mertler & 
Reinhardt, 2017). Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients are presented in Table 9. The 
results show that the individual measures of the CPSs activities in each of the five 
functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework of Identify (α = 0.89), Protect (α = 
0.85), Detect (α = 0.77), Respond (α = 0.82), and Recover (α = 0.74) have Cronbach’s 
alpha values greater than the minimum acceptable value of 0.70 to demonstrate 
acceptable reliabilities. In terms of internal consistencies, the results indicate good 




Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficients for the Five Functions of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (N=216) 
Constructs Cronbach's Alpha No. of Items 
Identity (ID) 0.89 20 
Protect (PR) 0.85 20 
Detect (DE) 0.77 10 
Respond (RS) 0.82 10 
Recover (RC) 0.74 10 
 
The survey instruments used to collect data for this study variables were tested to 
ensure the data are reliable (Levy, 2006). The variables involved in the ANOVA included 
CPSs and DMPRCA. The variables were tested for internal consistency using Cronbach’s 
alpha for reliability in terms of internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
coefficients are presented in Table 10. There are a total 70 items for the CPSs, the small 
business decision makers’ perceived risk for the 10 categories of cyber-attacks using a 7-
point Likert scale (PL x PI). The results show that the survey instruments used to measure 
the CPS (α = 0.95) and DMPRCA in terms of perceived likelihood (α = 0.90) and 
perceived impact (α = 0.93) have acceptable reliabilities or internal consistencies since 
the Cronbach’s alpha values were greater than the minimum acceptable value of 0.70. In 
fact, these constructs have Cronbach’s alpha values 0.90 and higher indicating that the 
measures for the dependent variables in the ANOVA to address RQ5 have excellent 





Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficients for CPSs and DMPRCA (Perceived Likelihood 
and Perceived Impact) 
Constructs Cronbach's Alpha No. of Items 
Cybersecurity Preparedness Scores 0.95 70 
Decision Maker’s Perceived Risk of Cyber-
Attack (Perceived Likelihood) 
0.90 10 
Decision Maker’s Perceived Risk of Cyber-
Attack (Perceived Impact) 
0.93 10 
 
Phase 2 – Data Analysis 
For RQ4, the data from the sample small businesses was evaluated and positioned 
on the CyPRisT using the CPS and the DMPRCA. First, these descriptive statistics were 
used to evaluate the data by summarizing the scores of the overall cybersecurity 
preparedness activities and perceived cybersecurity risk (perceived likelihood x perceived 
impact). Specifically, the central tendency measures of mean and standard deviation were 
used to summarize CPSs and DMPRCA variables. Figure 10 shows how the sample of 
216 small businesses are positioned on the CyPRisT with the CPS on the vertical axis and 





Figure 10. CyPRisT with Case Labels (N=216) 
 
For RQ5, the data from the sample small businesses was evaluated to determine if 
statistically significant differences exist in the CPSs and DMPRCA based businesses 
demographics of (a) industry, (b) number of employees - size, (c) years in operation, (d) 
annual revenue, and (e) IT budget. Additionally, the data were evaluated to determine if 
statically significant difference also exist in the CPSs and DMPRCA based on participant 
demographics of (f) role – owner or manager, (g) age, (h) gender, and (i) education. One-
way ANOVA was conducted to address RQ5 to determine whether there were significant 
differences in the scores of CPSs and DMPRCA for each of the business demographics 
(BD1 – BD5) and personal demographics (PD1 – PD4). A generally accepted 
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significance level of 0.05 was used to indicate difference in the means among the 
demographics (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017). 
Data analysis was performed on the sample of 216 small businesses. Table 11 
summarizes the descriptive statistics summaries of CPSs and DMPRCA variables. For 
CPSs, the mean score was 2.29 (SD = 1.06) indicated that the samples of small 
businesses have low overall CPSs. For DMPRCA, the mean score was 0.28 (SD = 0.16) 




Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA (N=216) 
Dependent Variable Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
CPSs 0.14 4.47 2.29 1.06 
DMPRCA 0.02 0.85 0.28 0.16 
 
Table 12 summarizes the descriptive statistics summaries of the responses on the 
DMPRCA in terms of perceived likelihood of the cyber-attack occurring at the small 
business. Based on the mean scores, the decision makers of small businesses perceived 
that they have a low likelihood (3) to moderate likelihood (4) of the cyber-attacks of 
general malware (M = 3.81; SD = 1.37), advanced malware/zero-day attack (M = 3.32; 
SD = 1.43), compromised/stolen devices (M = 3.32; SD = 1.41), cross-site scripting (M = 
3.19; SD = 1.52), denial of services (M = 3.16; SD = 1.56), malicious insider (M = 3.24; 
SD = 1.56), phishing/social engineering (M = 4.00; SD = 1.60), SQL injection (M = 3.11; 
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Descriptive Statistics of DMPRCA (Perceived Likelihood) (N=216) 
Perceived risk of cyber-attack 
(Perceived lowlihood) 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
PI1. General malware 1 7 3.81 1.37 
PI2. Advanced malware/zero-day attack 1 7 3.32 1.43 
PI3. Compromised/stolen devices 1 7 3.32 1.41 
PI4. Cross-site scripting 1 7 3.19 1.52 
PI5. Denial of services 1 7 3.16 1.56 
PI6. Malicious insider 1 7 3.24 1.56 
PI7. Phishing/social engineering 1 7 4.00 1.60 
PI8. SQL injection 1 7 3.11 1.49 
PI9. Web-based attack 1 7 3.66 1.56 
PI10. Other cyberattack 1 7 3.59 1.51 
 
Table 13 summarizes the descriptive statistics summaries of the responses on the 
DMPRCA in terms of level of impact the cyber-attack would have on the small business. 
Based on the mean scores, the decision makers of 216 samples of small businesses 
perceived that the cyber-attacks of general malware (M = 3.93; SD = 1.44), advanced 
malware/zero-day attack (M = 3.65; SD = 1.46), compromised/stolen devices (M = 3.76; 
SD = 1.45), cross-site scripting (M = 3.37; SD = 1.48), denial of services (M = 3.51; SD 
= 1.51), malicious insider (M = 3.74; SD = 1.61), phishing/social engineering (M = 3.75; 
SD = 1.50), SQL injection (M = 3.32; SD = 1.49), web-based attack (M = 3.68; SD = 
1.57), and other cyberattack (M = 3.63; SD = 1.51) have a low impact (3) to moderate 




Descriptive Statistics of DMPRCA (Perceived Impact) (N=216) 
Perceived risk of cyber-attack 
(Perceived impact) 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
PI1. General malware 1 7 3.93 1.44 
PI2. Advanced malware/zero-day attack 1 7 3.65 1.46 
PI3. Compromised/stolen devices 1 7 3.76 1.45 
PI4. Cross-site scripting 1 7 3.37 1.48 
PI5. Denial of services 1 7 3.51 1.51 
PI6. Malicious insider 1 7 3.74 1.61 
PI7. Phishing/social engineering 1 7 3.75 1.50 
PI8. SQL injection 1 7 3.32 1.49 
PI9. Web-based attack 1 7 3.68 1.57 
PI10. Other cyberattack 1 7 3.63 1.51 
 
A combination of descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA were used to 
address RQ4 and RQ5 for the nine demographics of (a) industry, (b) number of 
employees, (c) years in operation, (d) annual revenue, (e) IT budget, (f) role, (g) age, (h) 
gender, and (i) education. First, data were examined using descriptive statistic techniques 
such as calculating means scores and standard deviation. The descriptive statistics and 
frequency distributions were also useful for detecting any irregularities and summarizing 
the data (Mertler & Vannatta, 2017). The aggregate CPSs and DMPCA were then 
positioned on the CyPRisT to understand the distribution of the data according to the 
position for each quadrant of the taxonomy. Additionally, the mean for each demographic 
were positioned on the CyPRisT for analysis. Next, a one-way ANOVA process was 
performed using SSPS to determine if statically significant difference exist in the CPSs 




RQ4 and RQ5(a) – Industry (BD1) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the business industry focus. 
Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 14, the top three highest CPSs were those 
small businesses in the industries of communications, entertainment, media, and 
publishing (M = 2.98); information technology and software (M = 2.89); and construction 
and real estate (M = 2.76). On the other hand, the bottom three least CPSs were those 
small businesses in the industries of transportation (M = 1.24); agriculture and food 
services (M = 1.70); and retail (M = 1.85). Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 
15, the top three highest DMPRCA were in small businesses in the industries of banking 
and financial services (M = 0.43); information technology and software (M = 0.38); and 
education and research (M = 0.37). On the other hand, the three lowest DMPRCA were 
those small businesses in the industries of transportation (M = 0.16); warehousing, 
logistics, and distribution (M = 0.17); and agriculture and food services (M = 0.22). 
Figure 11 shows the CyPRisT by industry category and Figure 12 shows the CyPRisT by 




Descriptive Statistics of CPSs by Industry (N=216) 
Industry focus of business N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 





1. Agriculture & Food 
Services 
6 1.70 1.41 0.58 0.22 3.18 
2. Banking & Financial 
Services 
10 2.71 0.91 0.29 2.06 3.36 
3. Communications, 
Entertainment, 
Media, & Publishing 
18 2.98 0.90 0.21 2.54 3.43 
4. Construction & Real 
Estate 
18 2.76 1.43 0.34 2.05 3.47 
5. Education & 
Research 
13 2.16 0.86 0.24 1.64 2.68 
6. Energy (Oil, Gas, & 
Electricity) 
13 2.17 1.01 0.28 1.56 2.78 
7. Healthcare Services 
& Pharmaceuticals 
15 2.14 0.89 0.23 1.64 2.63 
8. Hospitality 11 2.03 0.89 0.27 1.44 2.63 








16 2.89 1.04 0.26 2.33 3.44 




23 2.09 1.06 0.22 1.63 2.54 
12. Repair & Installation 
Services 
6 2.58 1.09 0.45 1.43 3.72 
13. Retail 21 1.85 1.03 0.23 1.38 2.32 




4 1.96 1.11 0.55 0.20 3.72 
16. Other 27 1.98 0.75 0.14 1.68 2.27 





Descriptive Statistics of DMPRCA by Industry (N=216) 
Industry focus of business N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 





1. Agriculture & Food 
Services 
6 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.38 
2. Banking & Financial 
Services 
10 0.43 0.21 0.07 0.29 0.58 
3. Communications, 
Entertainment, 
Media, & Publishing 
18 0.27 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.33 
4. Construction & Real 
Estate 
18 0.29 0.22 0.05 0.18 0.40 
5. Education & 
Research 
13 0.37 0.12 0.03 0.29 0.44 
6. Energy (Oil, Gas, & 
Electricity) 
13 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.40 
7. Healthcare Services 
& Pharmaceuticals 
15 0.30 0.12 0.03 0.24 0.37 
8. Hospitality 11 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.28 








16 0.38 0.18 0.05 0.28 0.48 




23 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.34 
12. Repair & Installation 
Services 
6 0.26 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.36 
13. Retail 21 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.15 0.31 




4 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.33 
16. Other 27 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.19 0.28 





Figure 11. CyPRisT by Industry (N=216) 
 
 




Table 16 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on their industry focus. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed 
that there were significant differences in both the CPSs (F(15, 200) = 2.42, p < 0.01) and 
DMPRCA (F(15, 200) = 2.39, p < 0.01) for small businesses based on industry focus of 
business. There were significant differences in the one-way ANOVA results since the p-
values of the F-test were less than the level of significance of 0.05. The mean plots 
graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 13) and DMPRCA (Figure 14) significantly 
vary by industry categories of the small businesses. 
 
Table 16 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Industry (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 37.26 15 2.48 2.42 0.003** 
Within Groups 205.41 200 1.03 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.81 15 0.05 2.39 0.003** 
Within Groups 4.50 200 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
 
    





Figure 13. CPSs by Mean of Industry (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 14. DMPRCA by Mean of Industry (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(b) – Number of Employees [size] (BD2) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the number employees (business 
size). Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 17 and graphical representation in 
Figure 15, those small businesses with higher number of employees in business (e.g., 20 
to 29 full time employees; 30 to 39 full time employees) have greater CPSs and higher 
DMPRCA. Small businesses with lesser number of employees in business (e.g., 10 to 19 
full time employees; 20 to 29 full time employees) have lower CPSs and lower 
DMPRCA. Figure 16 shows the CyPRisT by mean number of employees. 
 
Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Number of Employees (N=216) 
DV Number of 
employees  
N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. 10-19 full-time 
employees 
74 1.89 1.09 0.13 1.64 2.14 
2. 20-29 full-time 
employees 
61 2.59 1.10 0.14 2.31 2.87 
3. 30-39 full-time 
employees 
37 2.43 0.89 0.15 2.13 2.73 
4. 40-49 full-time 
employees 
44 2.40 0.93 0.14 2.12 2.68 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. 10-19 full-time 
employees 
74 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.20 0.27 
2. 20-29 full-time 
employees 
61 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.25 0.33 
3. 30-39 full-time 
employees 
37 0.31 0.18 0.03 0.25 0.37 
4. 40-49 full-time 
employees 
44 0.33 0.13 0.02 0.29 0.37 




Figure 15. CyPRisT by Number of Employees (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 16. CyPRisT by Mean of Number of Employees (N=216) 
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Table 18 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on their size. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed that there 
were significant differences in both the CPSs (F(3, 212) = 5.89, p < 0.001) and 
DMPRCA (F(3, 212) = 4.24, p < 0.01) for small businesses based on number of 
employees in the business. There were significant differences in the one-way ANOVA 
results since the p-values of the F-test were less than the level of significance of 0.05. 
The mean plots graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 17) and DMPRCA (Figure 18) 
significantly vary by size of the small businesses. 
 
Table 18 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Number of Employees (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 18.66 3 6.22 5.89 0.001*** 
Within Groups 224.00 212 1.06 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.30 3 0.10 4.24 0.006** 
Within Groups 5.01 212 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   





Figure 17. CPSs by Mean of Number of Employees (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 18. DMPRCA by Mean of Number of Employees (N=216) 
121 
 
RQ4 and RQ5(c) – Years in Operation (BD3) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by years in operation. Based on 
mean comparisons shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 19, those 
small businesses with 10 to 14 years in operation and 1 to 4 have the greatest CPSs while 
those small businesses with the highest years in operation (e.g., 40+ years, M = 1.65) 
have the lowest CPSs. The DMPRCA were near equal in their mean DMPRCA. Figure 
20 shows the CyPRisT by mean for years in operation. 
 
Table 19 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Years in Operation (N=216) 
DV Years in 
operation 
N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 2. 1-4 years 34 2.60 0.92 0.16 2.27 2.92 
3. 5-9 years 69 2.05 1.06 0.13 1.80 2.31 
4. 10-14 years 39 2.74 0.98 0.16 2.42 3.06 
5. 15-19 years 20 2.25 1.09 0.24 1.74 2.76 
6. 20-39 years 36 2.28 1.11 0.19 1.90 2.65 
7. 40+ years 18 1.65 0.90 0.21 1.20 2.10 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 2. 1-4 years 34 0.29 0.13 0.02 0.24 0.33 
3. 5-9 years 69 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.25 0.33 
4. 10-14 years 39 0.30 0.18 0.03 0.24 0.36 
5. 15-19 years 20 0.27 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.37 
6. 20-39 years 36 0.25 0.12 0.02 0.21 0.29 
7. 40+ years 18 0.27 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.34 





Figure 19. CyPRisT by Years in Operation (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 20. CyPRisT by Mean of Years in Operation (N=216) 
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Table 20 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on years in operation. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed that 
there was significant difference only in the CPSs (F(5, 210) = 4.25, p < 0.01) for small 
businesses based on years in operation. The mean plots graphically showed that the CPSs 
(Figure 21) for small businesses significantly vary for small businesses with different 
years in operation. However, the results of the one-way ANOVA and mean plots (Figure 
22) showed that there were no significant difference in the DMPRCA (F(5, 210) = 0.50, p 
= 0.78) for small businesses based on years in operation. 
Table 20 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Years in Operation (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 22.29 5 4.46 4.25 0.001** 
Within Groups 220.38 210 1.05 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.06 5 0.01 0.50 0.777 
Within Groups 5.25 210 0.03 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   





Figure 21. CPSs by Mean of Years in Operation (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 22. DMPRCA by Mean of Years in Operation (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(d) – Annual Revenue (BD4) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by annual revenue. Based on mean 
comparisons shown in Table 21 and graphical representation in Figure 23, those small 
businesses with average annual revenues (e.g., $500K to $999K; $1M to $4.9M) have 
greater CPSs. Small businesses with lesser annual revenue (e.g., Less than $100K) appear 




Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Annual Revenue (N=216) 
DV Annual Revenue N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. Less than $100K 4 2.18 1.61 0.80 -0.38 4.73 
2. $100K to $249K 26 2.12 1.15 0.22 1.66 2.58 
3. $250K to $499K 26 1.98 0.94 0.18 1.60 2.36 
4. $500K to $999K 51 2.56 0.96 0.14 2.29 2.84 
5. $1M to $4.9M 79 2.38 1.07 0.12 2.14 2.62 
6. $5M to $20M 29 2.01 1.10 0.20 1.60 2.43 
7. More than $20M 1 1.29 . . . . 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. Less than $100K 4 0.36 0.08 0.04 0.23 0.49 
2. $100K to $249K 26 0.34 0.20 0.04 0.26 0.42 
3. $250K to $499K 26 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.25 
4. $500K to $999K 51 0.28 0.17 0.02 0.23 0.32 
5. $1M to $4.9M 79 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.26 0.33 
6. $5M to $20M 29 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.31 
7. More than $20M 1 0.35 . . . . 




Figure 23. CyPRisT by Annual Revenue (N=216) 
 
 




Table 22 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on annual revenue. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed that 
there were no significant differences in both the CPSs (F(6, 209) = 1.65, p = 0.14) and 
DMPRCA (F(6, 209) = 1.84, p = 0.09) for small businesses based on annual revenue. 
There were no significant differences in the one-way ANOVA results since the p-values 
of the F-test were greater than the level of significance of 0.05. The mean plots 
graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 25) and DMPRCA (Figure 26) were not 
significantly different by annual revenue categories of the small businesses. 
 
Table 22 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Annual Revenue (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 10.95 6 1.82 1.65 0.136 
Within Groups 231.72 209 1.11 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.27 6 0.04 1.84 0.092 
Within Groups 5.04 209 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   





Figure 25. CPSs by Mean of Annual Revenue (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 26. DMPRCA by Mean of Annual Revenue (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(e) – IT Budget (BD5) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by IT budget. Based on mean 
comparisons shown in Table 23 and graphical representation in Figure 27, those small 
businesses with higher IT budget (e.g., More than 10%; 7% - 10%, and 3%-6%) have 
greater CPSs and higher DMPRCA. Small businesses with lesser IT budget (e.g., Less 
than 1%; 1% - 2%) have lower CPSs and lower DMPRCA. Figure 28 shows the CyPRisT 
by annual revenue. 
 
Table 23 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by IT Budget (N=216) 
DV IT budget N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. Less than 1% 33 1.35 0.67 0.12 1.11 1.59 
2. 1% - 2% 46 1.85 0.79 0.12 1.62 2.08 
3. 3% - 6% 60 2.53 0.96 0.12 2.28 2.78 
4. 7% - 10% 67 2.77 1.07 0.13 2.51 3.03 
5. More than 10% 10 2.66 1.13 0.36 1.85 3.47 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. Less than 1% 33 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.19 0.26 
2. 1% - 2% 46 0.24 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.28 
3. 3% - 6% 60 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.25 0.33 
4. 7% - 10% 67 0.33 0.18 0.02 0.29 0.38 
5. More than 10% 10 0.29 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.40 





Figure 27. CyPRisT by IT Budget (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 28. CyPRisT by Mean of IT Budget (N=216) 
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Table 24 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on categories of IT budget. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed 
that there were significant differences in both the CPSs (F(4, 211) = 16.79, p < 0.001) 
and DMPRCA (F(4, 211) = 3.93, p < 0.01) for small businesses based on IT budget. 
There were significant differences in the one-way ANOVA results since the p-values of 
the F-test were less than the level of significance of 0.05. The mean plots graphically 
showed that the CPSs (Figure 29) and DMPRCA (Figure 30) significantly vary by IT 
Budget of the small businesses. 
 
Table 24 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by IT Budget (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 58.60 4 14.65 16.79 0.000*** 
Within Groups 184.07 211 0.87 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.37 4 0.09 3.93 0.004** 
Within Groups 4.94 211 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215       





Figure 29. CPSs by Mean of IT Budget (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 30. DMPRCA by Mean of IT Budget (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(f) – Role (PD1) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the participant’s role (owner or 
manager). Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 25 and graphical representation in 
Figure 31, the participants were near equal in their mean of CPSs and DMPRCA. Figure 
32 shows the CyPRisT by mean of the participant’s role. 
 
Table 25 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Role (N=216) 
DV Participant’s Role N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. Owner 104 2.28 1.06 0.10 2.07 2.48 
2. Manger 112 2.29 1.07 0.10 2.09 2.49 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. Owner 104 0.27 0.15 0.01 0.24 0.30 
2. Manager 112 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.26 0.32 





Figure 31. CyPRisT by Role (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 32. CyPRisT by Mean of Role (N=216) 
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Table 26 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on the participant’s role. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed 
that there were no significant differences in both the CPSs (F(1, 214) = 0.01, p = 0.91) 
and DMPRCA (F(1, 214) = 0.96, p = 0.33) for small businesses based on role since the p-
values of the F-test were greater than the level of significance of 0.05. The mean plots 
graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 33) and DMPRCA (Figure 34) were not 
significantly different by the participant’s role. 
 
Table 26 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Role (N=216) 





CPSs Between Groups 0.02 1 0.02 0.01 0.905 
Within Groups 242.65 214 1.13 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.02 1 0.02 0.96 0.328 
Within Groups 5.29 214 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   
* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 




Figure 33. CPSs by Mean of Role (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 34. DMPRCA by Mean of Role (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(g) – Age (PD2) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the participant’s age. Based on 
mean comparisons shown in Table 27 and graphical representation in Figure 35, the 
participants in age group 20 to 29 years have highest CPSs. Participant in the oldest age 
group, over 70 years, appear from the data in this study to have the lowest CPSs and 
highest DMPRCA. Figure 36 shows the CyPRisT by mean of the participant’s age. 
 
Table 27 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Age (N=216) 
DV Participant’s Age  N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. < 20 years 2 2.09 0.03 0.02 1.81 2.37 
2. 20 to 29 years 35 2.70 0.87 0.15 2.40 3.00 
3. 30 to 39 years 97 2.13 1.02 0.10 1.93 2.34 
4. 40 to 49 years 43 2.41 1.15 0.17 2.06 2.76 
5. 50 to 59 years 26 2.24 1.35 0.26 1.69 2.78 
6. 60 to 69 years 12 2.03 0.73 0.21 1.57 2.50 
7. Over 70 years 1 2.00     
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. < 20 years 2 0.23 0.00 0.00 .21 0.24 
2. 20 to 29 years 35 0.27 0.19 0.03 .20 0.33 
3. 30 to 39 years 97 0.29 0.13 0.01 .26 0.31 
4. 40 to 49 years 43 0.32 0.20 0.03 .26 0.38 
5. 50 to 59 years 26 0.22 0.11 0.02 .17 0.26 
6. 60 to 69 years 12 0.28 0.09 0.03 .22 0.34 
7. Over 70 years 1 0.39     





Figure 35. CyPRisT by Age (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 36. CyPRisT by Mean of Age (N=216) 
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Table 28 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on the participant’s age. The results of the one-way ANOVA showed 
that there were no significant differences in both the CPSs (F(6, 209) = 1.47, p = 0.19) 
and DMPRCA (F(6, 209) = 1.40, p = 0.22) for small businesses based on age since the p-
values of the F-test were greater than the level of significance of 0.05. The mean plots 
graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 37) and DMPRCA (Figure 38) were not 
significantly different by the participant’s age. 
 
Table 28 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Age (N=216)  





CPSs Between Groups 9.81 6 1.63 1.47 0.191 
Within Groups 232.86 209 1.11 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.20 6 0.03 1.40 0.218 
Within Groups 5.11 209 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   





Figure 37. CPSs by Mean of Age (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 38. DMPRCA by Mean of Age (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(h) – Gender (PD3) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the participant’s gender. Based 
on mean comparisons shown in Table 29 and graphical representation in Figure 39, the 
female participants were slightly higher in the mean of CPSs and equal in the mean of 
DMPRCA. Figure 40 shows the CyPRisT by mean of the participant’s gender. 
 
Table 29 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA by Gender (N=216) 
DV Participant’s 
Gender  
N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. Female 87 2.40 1.09 0.12 2.16 2.63 
2. Male 129 2.21 1.04 0.09 2.03 2.39 
Total 216 2.29 1.06 0.07 2.14 2.43 
DMPRCA 1. Female 87 0.28 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.32 
2. Male 129 0.28 0.15 0.01 0.26 0.31 





Figure 39. CyPRisT by Gender (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 40. CyPRisT by Mean of Gender (N=216) 
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Table 30 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on the participant’s gender. The results of the one-way ANOVA 
showed that there were no significant differences in both the CPSs (F(1, 214) = 1.58, p = 
0.21) and DMPRCA (F(1, 214) = 0.01, p = 0.92) for small businesses based on gender 
since the p-values of the F-test were greater than the level of significance of 0.05. The 
mean plots graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 41) and DMPRCA (Figure 42) were 
not significantly different by the participant’s gender. 
 
Table 30 
ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Gender (N=216)  





CPSs Between Groups 1.78 1 1.78 1.58 0.210 
Within Groups 240.88 214 1.13 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.923 
Within Groups 5.31 214 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   





Figure 41. CPSs by Mean of Gender (N=216) 
 
 
Figure 42. DMPRCA by Mean of Gender (N=216) 
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RQ4 and RQ5(i) – Education (PD4) 
This section presents the results of the descriptive statistics, CyPRisT positions, 
differences between groups, mean plots of CPSs and DMPRCA, as well as the CyPRisT 
mean for the sample of small businesses categorized by the participant’s education level. 
Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 31 and Table 32 as well as the graphical 
representation in Figure 43, the participants with high school diploma and college 
degrees have greater CPSs and lower DMPRCA. Figure 44 shows the CyPRisT by mean 
of the participant’s education level. 
 
Table 31 
Descriptive Statistics of CPSs by Education (N=216) 
DV Participant’s 
Education  
N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





CPSs 1. Less than high 
school diploma 
2 1.43 0.00 0.00 1.43 1.43 
2. High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
18 2.22 1.23 0.29 1.61 2.83 
3. Some college, no 
degree 
26 2.07 1.29 0.25 1.55 2.59 
4. Associate degree 21 2.37 1.10 0.24 1.87 2.87 
5. Bachelor’s degree 80 2.31 1.06 0.12 2.07 2.55 
6. MBA or master’s 
degree 
61 2.38 0.88 0.11 2.16 2.61 
7. Professional or 
doctoral degree 
8 2.12 1.31 0.46 1.02 3.21 






Descriptive Statistics of DMPRCA by Education (N=216) 
DV Participant’s 
Education  
N Mean SD S.E. 95% Confidence 





DMPRCA 1. Less than high 
school diploma 
2 0.33 0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.79 
2. High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
18 0.29 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.39 
3. Some college, no 
degree 
26 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.28 
4. Associate degree 21 0.28 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.34 
5. Bachelor’s degree 80 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.24 0.31 
6. MBA or master’s 
degree 
61 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.28 0.36 
7. Professional or 
doctoral degree 
8 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.37 
Total 216 0.28 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.30 
 
 




Figure 44. CyPRisT by Mean of Education (N=216) 
 
Table 33 summarizes the results of the one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA of the small 
businesses based on the participant’s education level. The results of the one-way 
ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences in both the CPSs (F(6, 209) = 
0.54, p = 0.77) and DMPRCA (F(6, 209) = 1.42, p = 0.21) for participant’s education 
level since the p-values of the F-test were greater than the level of significance of 0.05. 
The mean plots graphically showed that the CPSs (Figure 45) and DMPRCA (Figure 46) 






ANOVA Results of Difference in CPSs and DMPRCA by Education (N=216)  





CPSs Between Groups 3.73 6 0.62 0.54 0.774 
Within Groups 238.93 209 1.14 
  
Total 242.67 215 
   
DMPRCA Between Groups 0.21 6 0.03 1.42 0.209 
Within Groups 5.10 209 0.02 
  
Total 5.31 215 
   
* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
 





Figure 46. DMPRCA by Mean of Education (N=216) 
 
Phase 3 – Quasi-Experiment 
A quasi-experimental study was conducted to evaluate pretest-posttest results 
after their participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. To answer 
RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8, data were collected from a subgroup of the sample population of 
small business decision makers. First, a quantitative analysis of the pretest and posttest 
measures were used to identify difference’s in the CPSs and DMPRCA. A qualitative 
analysis was then completed for the cybersecurity preparedness activities that were 
implemented after participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. To 
conclude Phase 3 of this study, is a qualitative analysis of the participant’s decision to 




The cyberARMoRR Program and Pilot 
The cyberARMoRR program was developed using the topics that were approved 
by the cybersecurity SMEs during Phase 1 of this research study. Figure 47 presents the 
website home page that were provided to the participants. An overview of the program 
consisted of a high-level explanation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 
2018), general guidance on how to incorporate the framework as a security program for 
small businesses, resources and guides, as well as select case samples for adoption. 
Participants were introduced to the 10 common threats to small businesses (Ponemon 
Institute, 2018) and the SME descriptions. Additionally, the cybersecurity preparedness 
activities were explained as part of the fundamentals for adopting the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). Resources were provided for the common cyber 
threats (see Appendix I) as well as the five functions of the NIST cybersecurity 
framework (see Appendix J). The resources were mapped by cybersecurity preparedness 
activity and aligned to the appropriate framework function according to the primary 
content of subject matter. 
A pilot of the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses and website was 
provided to three small business owner participants. The initial feedback received from 
the owners were used to modify the design layout, organization and delivery of the 
program. Semi-structured interviews were completed after the program was finalized for 
this study. The participant interview questions to address RQ7 and RQ8 as well as 




Figure 47. The Cybersecurity Assessment of Risk Management to optimize Readiness and 
Resilience (cyberARMoRR) for Small Businesses Program, website 
www.cyberarmorr.org 
 
Phase 3 – Data Collection 
Data collection occurred between October 2019 and November 2019. A Google 
Form was used to present the survey instrument as a posttest measure (see Appendix K). 
A total of 50 survey responses were received and 15 semi-structured interviews were 
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conducted with participants during the time period. The data collection and analysis for 
Phase 3 included the same Phase 1 measures for the CPSs and DMPRCA, in addition to 
open-ended questions about the challenges of the cybersecurity preparedness activities 
for each function of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 
 
Phase 3 – Data Analysis (Quantitative) 
For RQ6, the CaseIDs from the posttest sample were used to filter pretest responses 
to ensure that results of the quasi-experiment were compared to the corresponding pretest 
sample data. The results for the pretest and posttest were analyzed using a paired sample 
t-test to compare the calculated means and determine if statistically significant 
differences exist in the dependent variables (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017). Thus, the results 
for the pretest and posttest were grouped representing the before and after participation in 
the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses, respectively. The result of the paired 
sample t-test indicated that there were no significant differences between the groups. 
Although, there was an observed increase in both the CPSs and DMPRCA that moved the 
position toward the ‘aversive’ quadrant of the CyPRisT. Table 34 shows the means, 
standard deviation of the CPSs and DMPRCA as well as the paired sample means of the 
pretest and posttest. Figure 48 presents the CyPRisT by mean for pretest (blue) and 
posttest (red). The result of the paired means t-test are presented in Figure 49 for the 





Pretest-Posttest Group Statistics of CPSs and DMPRCA (n=50) 
 
CPSs DMPRCA Paired Means 
Mean SD Mean SD t Sig. 
Pretest 2.26 1.13 0.28 0.13 -0.835 .406 
Posttest 2.45 1.09 0.33 0.12 -1.783 .078 
* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
 





Figure 49. Pretest and Posttest Mean Score of CPS (n=50) 
 
 
Figure 50. Pretest and Posttest Mean Score of DMPRCA (n=50) 
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For RQ7, the pretest and posttest data were compared to identify the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities that small business decision makers responded they have 
implemented after participation in cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. The 
changes in participant increased the CPSs and DMPRCA. Table 35 shows the most 
changed cybersecurity preparedness activities by function of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, ranked in order of high to low. Conversely, Table 36 shows the least 
changed responses of cybersecurity preparedness activities by function of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, ranked in order low to high. 
 
Table 35 
Most Changed Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities by Functions of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (n=50) 
Function Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities 
Identity 1. [ID9] Maintain an inventory of technology assets 
 2. [ID12] Assign risk values to information resources 
 3. [ID11] Develop a cybersecurity risk management strategy 
 4. [ID3] Allocate a budget specifically for cybersecurity 
Protect 1. [PR1] Regularly patch operating systems and applications, at least monthly 
 2. [PR10] Protect information assets from physical intrusion 
 3. [PR20] Safely dispose of old computers and media by scrubbing information 
from drives 
 4. [PR11] Enforce password management 
Detect 1. [DE2] Update anti-virus software, at least daily 
 2. [DE6] Perform vulnerability assessments, at least quarterly 
 3. [DE9] Maintain and analyze cybersecurity event logs 
Respond 1. [RS9] Have the ability to quickly stop or contain a cyber-attack 
 2. [RS4] Have an incident response plan with established roles and responsibilities 
 3. [RS1] Require training for employees to recognize cybersecurity events 
Recover 1. [RC2] Routinely backup essential computers and servers, at least monthly 
 2. [RC8] Make regular improvements to processes / procedures / technologies 
according to your assessed risks, at least monthly 




Least Changed Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities by Function of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (n=50) 
Function Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities 
Identity 1. [ID19] Identify cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and 
services that it provides and uses 
 2. [ID20] Require service level agreements (SLAs) with technology service 
providers 
 3. [ID17] Conduct cybersecurity gap analysis to determine what controls need to 
be implemented 
Protect 1. [PR4] Have an insider threat management program 
 2. [PR12] Use multi-factor authentication 
 3. [PR5] Use encryption for sensitive information 
Detect 1. [DE5] Baseline network utilization and detect anomalies in traffic patterns 
 2. [DE4] Use an intrusion detection and prevention system 
 3. [DE7] Perform test procedures at discrete intervals to identify cybersecurity 
events 
Respond 1. [RS10] Have the ability to collect digital forensic data about a cyber-attack or 
data breach 
 2. [RS6] Coordinate cyber incident response activities with internal stakeholders or 
external organizations 
 3. [RS8] Test disaster recovery / business continuity plan, at least annually. 
Recover 1. [RC6] Conduct mock exercises to test for failure of technology resources 
 2. [RC5] Coordinate restoration activities with internal stakeholders or external 
stakeholders 
 3. [RC9] Train employees on data breach reporting requirements for compliance 
with federal/state and industry regulations. 
 
DMPRCA were evaluated to determine what changes by perceived likelihood and 
perceived impact responses. Table 37 shows the most changed perceived risk after 
participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses, ranked in order of high 
to low. Conversely, Table 38 shows the least changed perceived risk after participation in 





Most Changed Perceived Risk of Cyber-attack (n=50) 
Construct Cyber-attack category 
Perceived Likelihood 1. [PL7] Phishing / social engineering 
 2. [PL6] Malicious insider 
 3. [PL1] General malware 
 4. [PL3] Compromised / stolen devices 
 5. [PL2] Advanced malware / zero-day attack 
Perceived Impact 1. [PI7] Phishing / social engineering 
 2. [PI3] Compromised / stolen devices 
 3. [PI6] Malicious insider 
 4. [PI2] Advanced malware / zero-day attack 
 5. [PI1] General malware 
 
Table 38 
Least Changed Perceived Risk of Cyber-attack (n=50) 
Construct Cyber-attack category 
Perceived Likelihood 1. [PL8] SQL injection 
 2. [PL5] Denial of services 
 3. [PL9] Web-based attack 
 4. [PL4] Cross-site scripting 
 5. [PL10] Other cyber-attack 
Perceived Impact 1. [PI5] Denial of services 
 2. [PI9] Web-based attack 
 3. [PI8] SQL injection 
 4. [PI10] Other cyber-attack 





Phase 3 – Data Analysis (Qualitative) 
For RQ8, five sources of data were used to analyze what cybersecurity 
preparedness activities were most challenging for small businesses to implement and 
why. The first data source was the frequency of ‘No’ responses to the cybersecurity 
preparedness activities for the sample population of small business collected during 
Phase 2 (N=216). The second data source was the frequency of ‘No’ responses to the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities for the subgroup population collected (n=50). The 
third data source was the amount of change between the pretest and posttest measures. 
The fourth was the open-ended question on the posttest for each of the functions. The 
fifth data source were notes taken from the semi-structured interviews (n=15). 
The goal of data analysis in qualitative research is to generate interpretative 
explanations from the data collected based on categories and themes that are developed 
into patterns (Creswell, 2014). Guided by Saldaña’s (2013) coding manual, a two-cycle 
coding process was used for the data analysis. For the first cycle, a magnitude coding 
process was used to differentiate the cybersecurity preparedness activities with frequent 
‘No’ responses, then a descriptive coding process was used for the open-ended survey 
responses as well as the notes recorded during the semi-structured interviews. For the 
second cycle, a pattern coding process was used to identify the emergent themes and 
explanations. The following tables are ordered low (least) to mid. Table 39 shows the 
least implemented cybersecurity preparedness activities from the Phase 2 sample of small 
businesses. Table 40 shows the least implemented cybersecurity preparedness activities 
from the pretest subset sample of small businesses. Table 41 shows the least implemented 




Least Implemented Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities by Function of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework – Phase 2 (N=216) 
Function Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities 
Identity 1. [ID3] Allocate a budget specifically for cybersecurity 
 2. [ID19] Identify cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and 
services that it provides and uses 
 3. [ID12] Assign risk values to information resources 
 4. [ID16] Prioritize actions based on potential impacts of a cybersecurity incident 
 5. [ID18] Have a plan for implementing new cybersecurity controls over time 
Protect 1. [PR4] Have an insider threat management program 
 2. [PR19] Have a data disposal policy 
 3. [PR12] Use multi-factor authentication 
 4. [PR15] Use web filters 
 5. [PR5] Use encryption for sensitive information 
Detect 1. [DE4] Use an intrusion detection and prevention system 
 2. [DE5] Baseline network utilization and detect anomalies in traffic patterns 
 3. [DE6] Maintain and analyze cybersecurity event logs 
 4. [DE10] Perform penetration testing, at least annually 
 5. [DE7] Perform test procedures at discrete intervals to identify cybersecurity 
events 
Respond 1. [RS6] Coordinate cyber incident response activities with internal stakeholders or 
external organizations 
 2. [RS8] Test disaster recovery / business continuity plan, at least annually 
 3. [RS10] Have the ability to collect digital forensic data about a cyber-attack or 
data breach 
 4. [RS4] Have an incident response plan with established roles and responsibilities 
 5. [RS5] Review incident response procedures, at least annually 
Recover 1. [RC6] Conduct mock exercises to test for failure of technology resources 
 2. [RC10] Have cyber insurance 
 3. [RC8] Make regular improvements to processes / procedures / technologies 
according to your assessed risks, at least monthly 
 4. [RC5] Coordinate restoration activities with internal stakeholders or external 
stakeholders 
 5. [RC9] Train employees on data breach reporting requirements for compliance 





Least Implemented Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities by Function of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework – Pretest Subgroup (n=50) 
Function Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities 
Identity 1. [ID3] Allocate a budget specifically for cybersecurity 
 2. [ID19] Identify cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and 
services 
 3. [ID16] Prioritize actions based on potential impacts of a cybersecurity incident 
 4. [ID18] Have a plan for implementing new cybersecurity controls over time 
 5. [ID1] Use a framework to manage cybersecurity 
Protect 1. [PR4] Have an insider threat management program 
 2. [PR19] Have a data disposal policy 
 3. [PR12] Use multi-factor authentication 
 4. [PR5] Use encryption for sensitive information 
 5. [PR14] Educate employees about social engineering and phishing scams 
Detect 1. [DE5] Baseline network utilization and detect anomalies in traffic patterns 
 2. [DE4] Use an intrusion detection and prevention system 
 3. [DE9] Perform vulnerability assessments, at least quarterly 
 4. [DE7] Perform test procedures at discrete intervals to identify cybersecurity 
events 
 10. [DE10] Perform penetration testing, at least annually 
Respond 1. [RS10] Have the ability to collect digital forensic data about a cyber-attack or 
data breach 
 2. [RS6] Coordinate cyber incident response activities with internal stakeholders or 
external organizations 
 3. [RS8] Test disaster recovery / business continuity plan, at least annually 
 4. [RS4] Have an incident response plan with established roles and responsibilities 
 5. [RS7] Have a disaster recovery / business continuity plan  
Recover 1. [RC8] Make regular improvements to processes / procedures / technologies 
according to your assessed risks, at least monthly  
 2. [RC6] Conduct mock exercises to test for failure of technology resources 
 3. [RC5] Coordinate restoration activities with internal stakeholders or external 
stakeholders 
 4. [RC10] Have cyber insurance 
 5. [RC9] Train employees on data breach reporting requirements for compliance 





Least Implemented Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities by Function of NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework – Posttest Subgroup (n=50) 
Function Cybersecurity Preparedness Activities 
Identity 1. [ID19] Identify cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and 
services  
 2. [ID3] Allocate a budget specifically for cybersecurity 
 3. [ID16] Prioritize actions based on potential impacts of a cybersecurity incident 
 4. [ID18] Have a plan for implementing new cybersecurity controls over time 
 5. [ID20] Require service level agreements with technology service providers 
Protect 1. [PR4] Have an insider threat management program 
 2. [PR19] Have a data disposal policy 
 3. [PR12] Use multi-factor authentication 
 4. [PR5] Use encryption for sensitive information 
 5. [PR15] Educate employees about social engineering and phishing scams 
Detect 1. [DE5] Baseline network utilization and detect anomalies in traffic patterns 
 2. [DE4] Use an intrusion detection and prevention system 
 3. [DE7] Perform test procedures at discrete intervals to identify cybersecurity 
events 
 4. [DE9] Perform vulnerability assessments, at least quarterly 
 5. [DE10] Perform penetration testing, at least annually 
Respond 1. [RS10] Have the ability to collect digital forensic data about a cyber-attack or 
data breach 
 2. [RS6] Coordinate cyber incident response activities with internal stakeholders or 
external organizations 
 3. [RS8] Test disaster recovery / business continuity plan, at least annually 
 4. [RS4] Have an incident response plan with established roles and responsibilities 
 5. [RS7] Have a disaster recovery / business continuity plan  
Recover 1. [RC6] Conduct mock exercises to test for failure of technology resources 
 2. [RC8] Make regular improvements to processes / procedures / technologies 
according to your assessed risks, at least monthly 
 3. [RC5] Coordinate restoration activities with internal stakeholders or external 
stakeholders 
 4. [RC10] Have cyber insurance 
 5. [RC9] Train employees on data breach reporting requirements for compliance 




The cyber preparedness activities were coded by magnitude of improved (+) or 
challenging (-) according the frequency of ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ responses, respectively. 
Descriptive reason codes, such as resources, time, and education, were assigned to the 
most challenging cyber preparedness activities as well as the participant’s explanation of 
the challenge (BBB, 2017). The codes were assigned using the “text clouds” technique in 
Microsoft Word following the suggested manual coding process of Chenail (2012) (see 
Appendix L). The first cycle involved coding the values of the cyber preparedness 
activities into categories for the open-ended survey questions and semi-structure 
interview responses. The categories of the combined responses were evaluated using 
thematic analysis in the second cycle to confirm the patterns (Creswell, 2014; Saldaña, 
2013). Cybersecurity benchmark reports, as well as cybersecurity researchers, have found 
the primary reasons limiting the ability of small businesses to improve their cybersecurity 
posture were lack of time, cyber-education, and resources (BBB, 2017; Hess & Cottrell, 
2015; Osborn & Simpson, 2015; Paulsen, 2016). Therefore, the a priori themes of Time, 
Education, and Resources were adopted for the analysis. 
 Figure 51 presents the themes and categories of the qualitative analysis that led to 
changes in the CPSs of the small business or challenges expressed why changes were not 
made. The theme of education includes categories of knowledge, applicability, and 
experience that contributed to the participants perceived risk of cyber-attacks. The theme 
of resources includes a category for materials for training and guidance, technology, 
costs, expertise. The resource theme of time is distinct because of the general time-
demand to focus on the cybersecurity preparedness activities. Hence, the themes signify a 
function of the overall cybersecurity posture and ability of the small business decision 
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maker to strategically balance cybersecurity readiness and resilience (Baskerville et al., 
2014; Hiscox, 2017). Furthermore, the analysis helps explain what cybersecurity 
preparedness activities were most challenging for small businesses and why. The 
participants commonly indicated that the cybersecurity preparedness activities were most 
challenging when the training/guidance was unclear which made it difficult to 
comprehend (gain knowledge), the technologies did not apply to their small business or 
was too advanced/expensive, that they possess the technical/experience, or they needed to 
focus on the business operations over cybersecurity. In most cases there were several 
reasons given – not just a single reason. Also, many decision makers indicated that they 
delegated the responsibility of cybersecurity to their IT specialist or an external service 
provider when the resource was available. 
 
 





The results of the data collection and data analysis were presented by phase. In 
Phase 1, a panel of SMEs were used to address RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3. In Phase 2 a 
sequential exploratory study was conducted to address RQ4 and RQ5. In Phase 3, a 
quasi-experimental study was conducted to address RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8. 
The results of Phase 1 were presented for the Delphi surveys. The SMEs had 
validated a set of cybersecurity preparedness activities that were based on the five 
functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. The SMEs also provided weights for 
the cybersecurity preparedness activities and approved a set of cyber-attacks that are 
common threats to small businesses. The set of cybersecurity preparedness activities, and 
their weighted values, were used for a benchmark CPSs. The set of common threats, and 
their descriptions, were used for the measure of DMPRCA. 
The results of Phase 2 were presented to show how small businesses are 
positioned on the CyPRisT using the CPSs and the DMPRCA. Further statistical analysis 
was conducted on the business demographic data of industry, number of employees, 
years in operation, annual revenue, IT budget as well as the participants demographic 
data of role, age, gender, and education. The results showed that there was a significant 
difference in both CPSs and DMPRCA when compared by industry, number of 
employees, and IT budget. There was a significant difference in the CPSs but not 
DMPRCA when compared by years in operation. There were no significant differences 
found in CPSs and DMPRCA when compared by annual revenue, role, age, gender, and 




The results of Phase 3 were presented to show differences in cybersecurity 
posture before and after participation in the cyberARMoRR program for small 
businesses. A sample of 50 small business participants were used in the analysis. 
Although the mean score was not statistically different, there was an observable uptick in 
both the CPSs and DMPRCA. The thematic analysis of the participant responses 
describing the challenges of cybersecurity preparedness activities suggest that decision 
makers are more likely to improve their ability to mitigate cyber threats when resources 
are easy to comprehend, applicable technologies are uncomplicated and reasonably 





Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Overview 
This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the data analysis and results. The 
findings and contribution to the body of knowledge within the IS field of study are 
discussed per the dissertation goals. The implications to practice and research are 
provided as well as recommendations for future research. Finally, the chapter summary 
section concludes this dissertation report with a synopsis of the research problem, the 
main goal of this study, a review of the research questions, the research methodology, 
and a summation of the findings and contribution. 
 
Conclusions 
Small business decision makers should strive to achieve a strategically balanced 
cybersecurity posture that considers both cyber readiness and resilience. This posture 
includes being prepared to minimize and manage risk as well as having the ability to 
maintain business operations during and after a cyber-attack (Bodeau & Graubart, 2017; 
Hurley, et al., 2014). If a small business is not prepared to deal with cyber threats it can 
be costly when a cyber-attack or data breach occurs (Ponemon, 2018). Considering the 
rising trend of cyber-attacks and the impacts on small businesses, it is imperative that 
small businesses overcome their limited ability to mitigate cyber threats. The decision to 
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improve the cybersecurity posture of a small business can significantly reduce the risk of 
disruption and loss.  
Among the top challenges that small businesses decision makers must overcome 
in order to improve their cybersecurity posture are knowing what to protect and the 
common cyber threats (Berry & Berry, 2018; Osborn & Simpson, 2018; Paulsen, 2016). 
The cybersecurity preparedness activities, as guided by the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (NIST, 2018), are fundamentally useful resources for small business owners 
and managers to consider adopting into their routine business processes (Paulsen & Toth, 
2016). The information can help develop or enhance resources to assist small businesses 
achieve a balance of cyber threat prevention and cyber-attack response strategies 
(Baskerville et al., 2014; Berry & Berry, 2018). 
The U.S. government and non-profit organizations are taking the initial steps to 
address limited availability of cybersecurity product materials as well as risk 
management programs that are tailored to meet the needs of the small businesses (Berry 
& Berry, 2018). While conducting this research study, in fall 2019, the U.S. 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released their Cyber Essentials 
guide for leaders of small businesses that provided recommendations for how to build a 
culture of cyber readiness (CISA, n.d.). The recommended actions appeared to be 
consistent with the cyber preparedness activities. Specific examples include developing a 
strategy for cyber activities to preparing for cyber-attacks, backing up data, patch and 
application update management, as well as responding and recovering from compromise 
(data-breach). The NIST Small Business Cybersecurity Corner (NIST, n.d.-b) and the 
NCSA’s StaySafeOnline and Stop.Think.Connect resource libraries (NCSA, n.d.) are 
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reliable sources of online free resources directed toward small business leaders. The 
NIST and NCSA publish articles and videos specifically aimed at helping small business. 
The NCSA also conducts training seminars, called Cybersecure MyBusiness, across the 
country for small business leaders. The workshops, monthly webinars, and expert 
discussion panels help educate the small business community on the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (NCSA, n.d.). 
 
Discussion 
This research study explored the relationship between two constructs associated 
with cybersecurity readiness and resilience of small businesses. Paulsen (2016) as well as 
Osborn and Simpson (2018) argued that small businesses were high risk for systems 
compromise because owners did not know what to protect. To address this issue, 
cybersecurity resources, educational materials and tools, for minimizing the 
vulnerabilities of small businesses are being developed. Cybersecurity guidance, such as 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2018), can help small businesses improve 
cybersecurity posture by informing what cybersecurity preparedness activities to perform. 
Furthermore, a well-balanced cybersecurity program can help small businesses develop a 
strategy for improving their cybersecurity risk management. Complimentary 
cybersecurity educational materials and guidance should help increase knowledge and 
awareness for interested small business decision makers. Uncomplicated, or easy to 
follow, guidance as well as simple cybersecurity tools should help those small businesses 
with limited technical experience to overcome the time demands. Part of the effort, and 
one of the goals of this research study was to identify the essential cybersecurity 
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preparedness activities within the NIST Cybersecurity Framework guidance to assess the 
level of cybersecurity preparedness for a small business. 
The SMEs approved a set of cybersecurity preparedness activities that represent 
the recommended fundamental procedures, practices, and policies for small businesses 
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016). Rohn et al. (2016) suggested that small business owners lacked 
commensurate action in cybersecurity because the decision makers were underestimating 
risk of cyber-attack and limited in their ability probabilities and impact. Thus, the SMEs 
also approved a set of common cyber threats with descriptions that provided the 
businesses decision makers a point of reference to the top cyber-attacks on small 
businesses from actual reported data and trends (Ponemon Institute, 2016, 1017, 2018).  
Berry and Berry (2018) suggested that differences in the perception of common 
cyber threats to small businesses were likely related to their lack of mitigating cyber risk. 
Accordingly, a research instrument was developed, and validated by SMEs, consisting of 
cybersecurity preparedness activities within the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework as well as 10 categories of common cyber-attack vectors that threaten small 
businesses. The SMEs assigned weights to the cybersecurity preparedness activities that 
enabled an aggregated benchmark score for the small businesses. The Ponemon Institute 
(2016, 2017, 2018) cyber-attack categories were used to provide familiarity to the small 
business decision maker as a frame of reference to the cyber threats. The SMEs also 
approved basic descriptions for the 10 common threat vectors to measure the small 
business decision makers’ perceived likelihood and perceived impact following the 
process of Sumner (2009) to calculate the perceived risk of cyber-attack. 
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The set of 70 SMEs approved cybersecurity preparedness activities within the five 
functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework were then used to empirically assess the 
level of cybersecurity preparedness of small businesses according to their risk perception. 
A CyPRisT taxonomy was proposed to assess the benchmark scores cybersecurity 
posture level positions of the small businesses. The CPSs, and DMPRCA were positioned 
on the CyPRisT for a sample of 216 small businesses having 10-49 full-time employees. 
Statistical differences were found in CPSs and DMPRCA for the demographic categories 
of industry, number of employees, and IT budget. Yet, only the CPSs were statistically 
different among the categories of years in operation. This finding suggests that 
cybersecurity guidance may be enhanced further by developing resources that target 
specific industry focus or taking into consideration the smaller sizes as well as limited 
budgets for smaller size businesses. The statistical difference in CPSs suggest that small 
businesses may focus on cybersecurity processes in early years, then move toward status 
quo biases as the focus shifts from startup infrastructure investment to routine business 
operations. It is suspected that the trend follows major technology innovations and 
business markets. Therefore, additional research is recommended on the cybersecurity 
cycles of small businesses over an extended period. 
The statistical differences in industry is likely due to the nature of business and 
information exchange that are associated with each industry focus. For example, the 
highest CPSs were small businesses in communications, entertainment, media, and 
publishing; information technology and software; and construction and real estate. These 
small businesses industries generally involve the protection of intellectual property as 
well as protection of sensitive information that may be governed by regulations and law. 
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The highest DMPRCA were those in banking & financial services; information 
technology & software, education and research. The small businesses in those industries 
are often targeted by cybercriminals, and among the more sophisticated attacks, because 
of their information assets (Ponemon Institute, 2018). An example is financial institution 
data such as bank account numbers and login information (Hayes et al., 2012). A 
reasonable assumption is that IT and software small businesses have high CPSs as well as 
DMPRCA because the technical nature of their business and knowledge of cyber threats.  
The lowest CPSs were small businesses in transportation; agriculture and food 
services; and retail. While the lowest DMPRCA were small business in transportation; 
warehousing, logistics, and distribution; and agriculture and food services. This suggests 
that these small businesses may be less technology dependent or may have stronger focus 
on their products and services. However, there were limited responses for these industries 
per the sample size. This appears to be a challenge with many small business studies and 
cybersecurity reports. For example, the Verizon DBIR (Verizon Enterprise, 2018), there 
were 0 results from small businesses in agriculture, and single digit results from real 
estate, transportation, energy and utilities. Another example can be drawn from the 
Ponemon Institute (2018) report where a sample of 383 had 2% or less in five of the 
industry categories. The limitation for business demographics, particularly in the industry 
focus, was expected because of the smaller percentage of registered small businesses 
within these categories (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Thus, future research is 
recommended to investigate the cybersecurity preparedness activities and perceived risk 
of cyber-attack for these underrepresented industries. 
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In IS research, social theories have been used to explain the lack of security 
controls among small businesses and their limited ability to improve their cybersecurity 
posture (Rohn et al., 2016). Applying the theoretical lens of prospect theory and status 
quo bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), provides insight into the relation between perceived risk and actual 
cybersecurity preparedness activities of the sample small businesses. The CyPRisT was 
developed for the assessment of cybersecurity postures of small businesses. The 
quadrants are based on the heuristics for risk perception and using decision weights 
inspired by cumulative prospect theory as well as status quo bias. 
The bottom left quadrant of the CyPRisT represented small businesses that are 
Indifferent, low DMPRCA and low CPSs. Indifference can be used to explain the 
decision maker’s unwillingness to abandon the status quo (Polites & Karahanna, 2012). 
The results of this research study showed that more than half of small businesses were 
potentially indifferent toward cybersecurity. This finding is consistent with the 
cybersecurity benchmark reports demonstrating nearly half of small businesses are 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks (BBB, 2017; Ponemon Institute, 2018; Symantec 
Corporation, 2018; Verizon Enterprise, 2018). This finding may help explain why 
approximately half of small businesses remain at risk of loss due to a cyber-attack. 
The bottom right quadrant of the CyPRisT represented small businesses that were 
Susceptible to losses, high DMPRCA and low CPSs. Susceptibility, also referred to as 
risk-seeking behaviors (Liang & Xue, 2009), can help explain the relation between high 
levels of perceived risk and a low level of cyber preparedness. The results of this study 
showed that few small businesses exhibited risk-seeking cybersecurity postures. This 
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finding suggests that small business decision maker’s awareness of cyber threats and 
potential loss may motivate action toward mitigating cyber threats through the essential 
cybersecurity preparedness activities.  
The top left quadrant of the CyPRisT represented a risk Aversive posture, low 
DMPRCA and high CPSs. Loss aversion can help explain the effect in relation between 
rational decision making when the choice to become risk-averse is based on the perceived 
point of reference for cyber risk and potential loss (Li et al., 2016). The results showed 
that slightly less than half the small businesses were risk averse. Many of these small 
businesses implemented the fundamental cybersecurity controls through their IT 
department, were regulated by their industry (e.g., Banking & Financial Services, 
Healthcare), and were committed to protecting their customer information (e.g., 
Hospitality, Construction & Real Estate). This finding suggests that small business 
decision makers with low perceived risk of cyber-attack were less focused on managing 
cyber risk. 
The top right quadrant of the CyPRisT represented a Strategic balance between 
understanding cyber risk and the security controls necessary for being prepared to deal 
with cyber-attacks, high DMPRCA and high CPSs. The strategic actions for mitigating 
threats were based on the biases, judgment and heuristics, found in small business 
decision maker’s need to maintain business continuity when faced with adversity 
(Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015). This finding suggests that a small percentage of small 
business are taking appropriate action to establish strong cybersecurity posture or 
exhibiting a high level of cybersecurity situational awareness to achieve an adequate 
balance between cybersecurity readiness and resilience. 
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The SME-approved cybersecurity preparedness activities were evaluated along 
with the perception of cyber risk to assess the decision maker’s ability to improve 
cybersecurity posture of small businesses. For this research study, the cyberARMoRR for 
small business program was developed into a resource consisting of references to the 
publicly available resources for small business decision makers (e.g., NIST and NCSA 
publications). The survey instrument, consisting of cybersecurity preparedness activities 
and decision maker’s perceived risk of cyber-attack, was used for a quasi-experiment 
(pretest and posttest) measure of small businesses. The quasi-experimental results 
revealed there were no statistically significant differences in the CPSs as well as the 
DMPRCA before and after participation in the cyberARMoRR program. The differences 
did have a variation in responses demonstrated by the standard deviation for the 
dependent variables. However, there was an observable improvement in the cybersecurity 
posture for the participants of the cyberARMoRR program. Both CPSs and DMPRA 
moved toward achieving a strategically balanced approach for managing cyber risk. 
The small business owners and managers responded on the specific cybersecurity 
preparedness activities that were implemented after participation in the cyberARMoRR 
program. The participants of the 15 semi-structured interviews also described what 
cybersecurity preparedness activities were most challenging for their small businesses to 
implement and why. In cases where the perceived risk of cyber-attack was increased in 
the posttest, the decision makers had taken multiple actions to mitigate cyber risk. The 
results showed that easy to implement cyber preparedness activities (e.g., allocating a 
budget for cybersecurity, regularly operating systems and applications, updating-virus 
software, reviewing backups) slightly helped to improve their cybersecurity posture.  
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The more challenging cybersecurity preparedness activities were often delegated 
to IT specialists, or external providers, with advanced technical expertise. The small 
business decision makers explained that there was not enough time to focus on 
cybersecurity, they did not possess the knowledge, or they did not consider the 
technology / cyber risk applicable to their small business. These findings help to explain 
why many small businesses are underprepared to deal with the cyber risk (Hiscox, 2017; 
Rohn et al., 2016). The participants that showed improvements to their cybersecurity 
posture incorporated the cybersecurity preparedness activities into their routine 
businesses processes as a function of managing their overall business risk. 
Paulsen (2016) previously suggested that cybersecurity practices may be tailored 
by industry because their training and requirements vary on the nature of their business. 
Additionally, the impact of a cybersecurity event could depend on the industry specific 
cyber threats (Paulsen & Toth, 2016). The size of the business demographic finding was 
consistent with extant research (Rohn et al., 2016). The Ponemon Institute (2018) 
suggested that small businesses not having an adequate budget and expertise were less 
likely to achieve a strong cybersecurity posture. The results of this study confirmed 
empirically that the cybersecurity posture, as positioned on the CyPRisT, was not as 
strong for small businesses with lower budget allocations. 
 
Implications 
There are several implications for practice and research. From a practical 
perspective, the implications of this research study can be used to further develop 
programs that help small businesses overcome their lack of cybersecurity preparedness 
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and the limited ability deal with cyber-attacks. From a theoretical perspective, the 
implications are within IS studies relative to social theories in organizational and business 
management as well as human decision-making processes in areas of phycology and 
economics. The implications for practice and research are discussed in the next sections 
followed by recommendations for future research. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Cybersecurity educational providers should offer materials that focus on 
increasing awareness of cyber threats that are targeting the vulnerabilities of small 
businesses. A contribution to practice was the development of the cyberARMoRR 
program for small businesses that serves as a useful resource to assist small business 
decision makers in their continuous efforts to mitigate cyber threats through a prioritized 
set of cybersecurity preparedness activities. The survey instrument can be used as a basic 
risk assessment benchmarking tool to identify areas for improving cybersecurity postures. 
The cyberARMoRR program for small businesses also provides an introduction to the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework and outlines specific recommendations for small 
businesses to adopt into their business routines. The resources associated with common 
cyber threats and the cybersecurity preparedness activities can help simplify efforts for 
small business owners and managers that are seeking information on related topics. In 
particular, the information can help small businesses understand better what fundamental 





Implications for Research 
The theoretical implications, using the lens of prospect theory and status quo bias, 
add to the understanding of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. A 
contribution to research was the instrument and CyPRisT Taxonomy that can be used to 
compare the distribution of small businesses in quadrants, thereby providing insight into 
small businesses cybersecurity posture relative to their perception of cyber risk. For 
example, limited technical knowledge and experience may contribute to a status quo bias 
that inhibits the decision maker’s ability to assess cybersecurity risk and management 
(Berry & Berry, 2018). A rise in the business decision maker’s cybersecurity awareness 
and basic understanding of identifying cyber-attack methods can inspire small businesses 
to become more risk adverse (Bhattacharya, 2015). The decision makers’ perceptions of 
likelihood and impact can be used to influence decisions away from indifference toward a 
strategically balanced approach for managing risk. This research study provides 
empirically validated set of cybersecurity preparedness activities and taxonomy, as well 
as cybersecurity resources, to use for measuring and improving the cybersecurity posture 
of small businesses. 
 
Recommendations and Future Research 
As with any research study, there are strengths, weaknesses, and limitations 
inherent to the problem and questions, as well as the methodology. A strength of this 
research study was the relevance and significance of the problem to address a gap in IS 
literature that focused on the small business community for cybersecurity IS research 
(Gafni & Pavel, 2019). The theoretical foundations of status quo bias and advances in 
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prospect theory have been distinguished by the work of senior scholars and published in 
top ranking journals (Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009; Lee & Joshi, 2016; Li et al., 2016; Liang 
& Xue, 2009; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Another 
strength was the mixed-methods approach of data collection to draw on the strengths of 
each method (Creswell & Clark, 2017). Learning from the weaknesses and limitations of 
this study provides opportunity for recommendations. The results, conclusions, and 
implications can also expose several opportunities for future research. 
The first recommendation is further development to the proposed construct of 
cybersecurity preparedness. Future research projects may consider a condensed list of the 
most crucial cybersecurity preparedness activities (e.g., 5 or 10 in each function). The 
survey instruments did not include an ‘I do not know option’ for the participants. This 
information may be useful in identifying the activities that the participant did not have 
direct knowledge, such as those delegated to IT resources. Similarly, the measure of the 
decision makers’ perceived risk did not include an option for assessing their 
understanding of the threat definitions. The scope of this research study was delimited to 
a sample of small businesses in the U.S. with 10-49 employees because they were 
considered among the most vulnerable (BBB, 2017; Hiscox, 2017; Rohn et al., 2016; 
Sumner, 2009). Future studies are recommended to contrast findings of small-medium or 
medium size businesses, or those of small size with greater populations in specific 
industries. For the quasi-experiment, a longer period may be taken between the pretest 
and posttest to observe and better understand the cybersecurity preparedness activities 
that are more challenging for small businesses. It is recommended that future research 
broaden the sample population of small businesses by conducting comparative studies of 
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small businesses in other countries as part of a larger on-going research effort to help 
improve the cybersecurity postures. Future studies may explore the possibility of 
developing additional education material for small business decision makers to mitigate 
the common threats. Using a similar quasi experimental method of pretest and posttest, 
formal training on select cybersecurity preparedness activities may provide insight on 
some of the advanced concepts of cybersecurity risk management. 
The CyPRisT can be applied to more robust data analysis to determine the effects 
of multivariate factors. As Lee and Joshi (2016) point out, there are several key 
constructs used in prospect theory and status quo bias that have been oversimplified in 
research. For example, this research study intentionally did not evaluate the cost factors 
as it relates to status quo and loss aversion. Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) applied status 
quo bias to address the problem of how users evaluate IS technologies and subsequently 
their decision to resist change (i.e., remain status quo). Their study identified gaps in 
understanding cognitive misperception underlying resistance, such as psychological 
(sunk costs, social norms, and control) and rational decision-making mechanisms (net 
benefits, transition costs, and uncertainty costs). Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) also 
observed that an explanation of user resistance due to status quo bias, or the preference to 
stay with the current situation was particularly absent from literature. The results of their 
testing justified a new construct of switching costs which mediates the relationship 
between user resistance and other antecedents. This likely applies to small businesses in 
the context of cybersecurity preparedness activities based on their perception of risk. In 
Kim and Kankanhalli (2009), the costs compared for perceived value are referred to as 
switching benefits and switching costs, respectively, because they apply to the switch 
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(change) from the status quo. This phenomenon can be evaluated in the context of small 
businesses decision makers’ resistance to change their cybersecurity posture. 
An interesting finding of this study was the disparity in the low DMPRCA when 
the CPS was high. One possible explanation is that the DMPRCA was low because the 
decision makers were confident in their cybersecurity readiness and resilience. For 
example, if the company is making routine backups of critical data and testing those 
backups frequently then they may not be as vulnerable to a ransomware cyber-attack. 
However, in most cases where perceived risk of cyber-attack was elevated, the decision 
makers indicated action toward mitigating cyber risk through the implementation of the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities. Future research can further investigate a causal 
relationship of implemented cybersecurity preparedness to cyber risk perceptions. 
Among the weaknesses of this research study was participant fatigue. As 
indicated in the responses small business decision makers were limited by their time and 
availability. Although the design of the survey instrument included short and clearly 
written questions, the amount of questions may have been a deterrent to some 
participants. Nearly all participants expressed a genuine desire to improve their 
cybersecurity posture. However, the participation involvement averaged 30-45 minutes 
for pretest survey, several hours of instruction and resource reviews for the 
cyberARMoRR program, an un-determined amount of time implementing the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities, and another 30-45 minutes for the posttest survey. 
For the remaining participants, the final leg of this study, a 15-30 minutes semi-structured 
interview, peaked their participation threshold. The complexity of this research study 
demanded a considerable amount of the participants time during a short period. 
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Recommendation for future research would be to conduct a longitudinal study that 
focuses on small businesses overcoming the challenges of limited resources to improve 
their cybersecurity posture. 
Finally, there are areas of research in the which the ‘calculus’ of cybersecurity 
decision-making process may be studied. Prospect theory and status quo bias are rooted 
on concepts of the framing effect, heuristics as well as biases, and decision weights for 
gains or losses (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). These 
concepts are used for establishing reference points for judgments and choices based on 
risk preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). However, in cybersecurity, loss aversion 
appears to be the principle driver for decision biases. Risk factors can be evaluated 
through further experimentation of potential outcomes of cyber-attacks based on the 
resource investment costs of time and effort. Accordingly, future work is recommended 
in the ‘Psychonomics of cybersecurity’, which considers both phycological and economic 
weights in decision-making for cybersecurity counter measures and controls. 
 
Summary 
This research addressed the problem of small businesses having limited ability to 
mitigate cyber threats, which leads to significant losses from cyber-attacks or data 
breaches (Berry & Berry, 2018; Paulsen, 2016; Rohn et al., 2016). The research focused 
on small businesses in the U.S. with 10-49 employees because they are among the most 
vulnerable to cyber-attack (BBB, 2017; Hiscox, 2017; Rohn et al., 2016). The main goal 
of this research study was to develop and validate a small business CyPRisT to 
empirically assess small businesses’ cybersecurity postures, then to develop a strategy 
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program for small businesses to improve their cybersecurity risk management. The 
empirical assessment of cybersecurity readiness and resilience in small businesses 
provided insight into the decision-making process toward improving cybersecurity 
strategic posture. It also provided information into an area with a limited number of 
research studies that assesses the cybersecurity activities in small businesses for dealing 
with cyber threats (Gafni & Pavel, 2019). 
This research study followed a three-phase approach to address the research goal. 
Phase 1 utilized the Delphi method having 2 rounds of interaction with participation from 
22 cybersecurity SMEs. The Delphi method was used for instrument development. The 
SMEs validated the proposed construct of cybersecurity preparedness and updated the 
construct of decision maker’s perceived risk of cyber-attack. The SMEs feedback also 
helped identify topics for the cyberARMoRR program for small businesses. Phase 2 was 
a sequential exploratory to evaluate 216 small businesses in the U.S. Phase 3 was a 
sequential embedded quasi-experiment of 50 small business using the same instrument to 
measure before (pretest) and after (posttest) participation in the cyberARMoRR program. 
During Phase 1 data were collected from the SMEs for development of the 
instrument to addresses RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3. For RQ1, the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework was used as the basis for determining which cybersecurity preparedness 
activities, organized by the five functions, could be used to measure the level of 
cybersecurity preparedness for a small business. For RQ2, SMEs provided weights to the 
cybersecurity preparedness activities that were used in the development of the aggregate 
benchmark score for levels of preparedness. For RQ3, cyber-attacks were defined for the 
most common cyber threats to small business. The approved survey instrument was used 
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as pretest and posttest measures of participants in the Phase 2 & Phase 3 quasi-
experiment. 
During Phase 2, data were collected from 216 small business owners and 
managers using the SME validated instrument to conduct a quantitative empirical 
assessment documenting the results of the benchmark scores, thereby addressing RQ4 
and RQ5. For RQ4, the CPS and DMPRCA were applied to the CyPRisT to assess the 
cybersecurity posture level positions of the 216 small businesses. For RQ5, the data were 
analyzed using analysis of variance procedures (Mertler & Reinhard, 2017). This study 
found that there were significant differences between the CPSs and DMPRCA for the 
industry focus of small businesses, as well as significant differences when categorized by 
size (number of employees) and IT budget (%). The CPSs and DMPRCA were positioned 
on the CyPRisT for a sample of 216 small businesses. Through the theoretical lens of 
prospect theory and status quo bias, the results showed that approximately half of the 
small business were indifferent – unwilling to abandon their status quo – in order to 
achieve a strategically balanced approach for managing cyber risk. The results also 
revealed that small businesses did not typically demonstrate risk-seeking postures. 
Slightly less than half of the small businesses demonstrated that they were either risk 
adverse or strategically balanced.  
During Phase 3, the cyberARMoRR for small business program was developed 
and administered to a sub-sample of 50 research participants to address RQ6, RQ7, and 
RQ8. For RQ6, pretest and posttest data were analyzed using a paired sample t-test to 
compare the calculated means and determine if statistically significant differences exist in 
the dependent variables (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017). For RQ7, the differences between 
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groups were quantitatively assessed using descriptive statistics of the change in 
cybersecurity preparedness and qualitatively by differences in the CyPRisT positions. For 
RQ8, data were analyzed from the open-ended questions of the survey instrument. There 
were 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with the voluntary participants. The open 
questions in the survey instrument were combined with the interview notes then coded 
for qualitative analysis (Creswell, 2014; Myers & Newman, 2007). A two-cycle process 
of manually coding categories and emergent themes was used to analyze the data 
(Saldaña, 2013).  
The quasi-experimental results did not show statistically significant differences in 
the CPSs as well as the DMPRCA before and after participation in the cyberARMoRR 
program. However, the data collected from the participants on cybersecurity preparedness 
activities that were implemented after participation in the cyberARMoRR program for 
small business provided insight into the bias for, or against, the decision maker’s choices 
to improve their small businesses’ cybersecurity posture. The small business owners and 
managers described what cybersecurity preparedness activities were most challenging for 
small businesses to implement and why. The thematic analysis suggest that decision 
makers are more likely to improve their ability to mitigate cyber threats when resources 
are easy to comprehend, applicable technologies are uncomplicated and reasonably 
priced, technical expertise is obtainable, and implementing the activities into practice 
does not demand a substantial amount of time. Most importantly, small business decision 
makers should continue to strive toward a strategy for improving their cybersecurity 
posture; a balanced of being prepared to manage cyber risk and the ability to minimize 


























































































































































Instrument Questions with SME Assigned Weight 
Item Question Weight 
ID1 Does your business use a framework to manage cybersecurity? (a 
documented set of policies, procedures, standards and practices to 
protect critical business processes as well as information technology 
assets) 
6.45 
ID2 Does your business evaluate cybersecurity strategies on their 
alignment with business goals, at least annually? 
6.00 
ID3 Does your business allocate a budget specifically for cybersecurity? 6.18 
ID4 Does your business control who has access to your information? (i.e., 
systems access policy) 
6.77 
ID5 Does your business conduct employee background checks? (e.g. level-
3 check includes a criminal record search and looks for credentials that 
are work related) 
6.27 
ID6 Does your business require individual user accounts for each 
employee? 
6.55 
ID7 Does your business assign cybersecurity roles and responsibilities to 
employees? (may include third-party stakeholders or managed service 
providers) 
5.82 
ID8 Does your business identify and classify your information types? (e.g., 
private, public, sensitive, confidential, & proprietary) 
6.50 
ID9 Does your business maintain an inventory of computer hardware 
assets? (e.g. servers, workstations) 
6.23 
ID10 Does your business maintain an inventory of approved software? 6.14 
ID11 Does your business have a cybersecurity risk management strategy? 
(e.g. defined risk tolerances to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information) 
6.45 
ID12 Does your business assign risk values to information resources? 6.14 
ID13 Does your business assess the likelihood of cyber threats? 6.32 
ID14 Does your business identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities? 6.55 
ID15 Does your business identify costs (monetary or otherwise) associated 
with cyber risk impacts? 
6.14 





ID17 Does your business conduct cybersecurity analysis to determine what 
controls need to be implemented? 
6.32 
ID18 Does your business have a plan for implementing new cybersecurity 
controls over time? 
6.18 
ID19 Does your business identify cyber supply chain risks associated with 
the products and services that it provides and uses? 
5.64 
ID20 Does your business require service level agreements (SLAs) with 
technology service providers? 
6.18 
PR1 Does your business regularly patch your operating systems and 
applications, at least monthly? 
6.77 
PR2 Does your business use software and/or hardware firewalls? 6.73 
PR3 Does your business have a privacy policy? 6.45 
PR4 Does your business have an insider threat management program? 6.09 
PR5 Does your business use encryption for sensitive information? 6.77 
PR6 Does your business limit employee access to data and information 
through access controls? 
6.64 
PR7 Does your business control the use of administrative privileges? (e.g., 
only use administrative accounts when they are required) 
6.64 
PR8 Does your business restrict downloading and installing software by 
non-administrators? 
6.41 
PR9 Does your business disable access when an employee leaves the 
business? 
6.82 
PR10 Does your business protect information assets from physical intrusion? 6.68 
PR11 Does your business enforce password management? (e.g., password 
policy with strong passwords, expirations, changing all default 
administrative passwords) 
6.64 
PR12 Does your business use multi-factor authentication? 6.14 
PR13 Does your business restrict personal or untrusted storage devices or 
hardware? (e.g., USB drives & removable media) 
6.36 
PR14 Does your business educate employees about social engineering and 
phishing scams? (incl. malicious email attachments and internet links) 
6.77 
PR15 Does your business use web filters? (e.g., whitelisting to allow pre-
approved sites or domains, blacklisting unauthorized sites or domains) 
6.18 
PR16 Does your business use email filters? (e.g., scanning and blocking 




PR17 Does your business restrict the use of web browser, such as email 
client plugins or add-on applications? 
5.86 
PR18 Does your business enforce separate use of personal and business 
computers, mobile devices, and accounts? (e.g., acceptable use policy) 
5.82 
PR19 Does your business have a data disposal policy? 5.82 
PR20 Does your business safely dispose of old computers and media by 
scrubbing information from drives? 
6.50 
DE1 Does your business use anti-virus software? (also known as anti-
malware) 
6.55 
DE2 Does your business update anti-virus software, at least daily? 6.50 
DE3 Does your business use endpoint security software? (endpoint devices 
include mobile devices such as laptops, tablets, phones and other 
wireless devices connected to a business network – endpoint software 
typically includes anti-virus software) 
6.41 
DE4 Does your business use an intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IDPS)? 
6.09 
DE5 Does your business baseline network utilization and detect anomalies 
in traffic patterns? 
5.68 
DE6 Does your business maintain and analyze cybersecurity event logs? 
(either in-house or managed security service provider) 
6.32 
DE7 Does your business perform test procedures at discrete intervals to 
identify cybersecurity events? 
5.91 
DE8 Does your business verify the effectiveness of protective measures? 
(e.g., malicious code detection, unauthorized access) 
6.23 
DE9 Does your business perform vulnerability assessments, at least 
quarterly? 
6.23 
DE10 Does your business perform penetration testing, at least annually? 5.73 
RS1 Does your business require training for employees to recognize 
cybersecurity events? 
6.59 
RS2 Does your business analyze notifications of suspicious cyber activities 
reported from employees? 
6.68 
RS3 Does your business have a roster of support contacts & vendors in the 
case of cybersecurity events? 
6.32 
RS4 Does your business have an incident response plan with established 
roles and responsibilities? (IR plan focuses on an immediate response 




RS5 Does your business review incident response procedures, at least 
annually? 
6.05 
RS6 Does your business coordinate cyber incident response activities with 
internal stakeholders or external organizations? (external agencies 
such as law enforcement, service providers) 
5.95 
RS7 Does your business have a disaster recovery / business continuity 
plan? (DR/BC plan focuses on establishing business operations at the 
primary or an alternate location). 
6.55 
RS8 Does your business test disaster recovery / business continuity plan, at 
least annually? 
6.50 
RS9 Does your business have the ability to quickly stop or contain a cyber-
attack? (either in-house or external expertise, such as service provider) 
6.23 
RS10 Does your business have the ability to collect digital forensic data about 
a cyber-attack or data breach? (either in-house or external expertise, 
such as service provider) 
5.95 
RC1 Does your business have a plan to ensure timely restoration of systems 
or assets effected by cybersecurity events? (i.e., disaster recovery 
plan) 
6.45 
RC2 Does your business routinely backup essential computers and servers, 
at least monthly? 
6.77 
RC3 Does your business routinely backup important data/information, at 
least weekly? 
6.55 
RC4 Does your business use an offsite storage area for backups? 6.27 
RC5 Does your business coordinate restoration activities with internal 
stakeholders or external stakeholders? (external vendors, service 
providers, etc.) 
5.77 
RC6 Does your business conduct mock exercises to test for failure of 
technology resources? (e.g., equipment breakdown, software crashes, 
human error, etc.) 
5.68 
RC7 Does your business review backup processes / procedures / 
technologies, at least twice a year? 
6.23 
RC8 Does your business make regular improvements to processes / 
procedures / technologies according to your assessed risks, at least 
monthly? 
5.27 
RC9 Does your business train employees on data breach reporting 
requirements for compliance with federal/state and industry 
regulations? 
6.23 
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